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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
The economic integration of world economies over recent decades has led to a
spectacular transformation of the global economy. Several historical events have
contributed to this dynamic integration process. First, fast-growing emerging mar-
kets, with China and other East Asian economies at the forefront have imple-
mented economic reforms, opened up their markets and integrated into the world
economy. Second, the creation of institutions such as the single market program,
and the introduction of the Euro has further deepened the economic integration
in the European Union. Third, after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the transition
from planned to market economies, many Eastern European countries have reori-
ented towards the European Union, resulting in the Eastern European Enlargement
in 2004. Finally, the removal of protectionist measures and the development of
new technologies have led to a strong reduction in transport and communication
costs (Krugman (1995), Feenstra (1998)).
As a consequence of these events trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
flows have increased dramatically over recent decades as shown in Figure 1.1.
In the period from 1970 to 2008, total world trade flows increased from 2,922
billion USD to 25,619 billion USD with an annual average growth rate of 6%.1
By comparison, world GDP at the same time grew with an annual rate of 3%
only and increased from 12,163 billion USD to 40,575 billion USD (World Bank
1World trade flows are measured as the sum of imports and exports of all worldwide trading
countries. Source: World Bank (2010).
1
(2010)).
Figure 1.1: Worldwide Trade and FDI flows from 1970-2008
Notes: The graph summarizes worldwide trade and FDI flows in developing and developed countries for the period
from 1970 to 2008 and are in 2005 constant USD. Trade is measured as the sum of exports and imports between all
countries. FDI is the sum of total inward FDI in the reporting economy. Developed countries are all high-income
countries and developing countries are all middle- and low-income countries according to the definition of the
World Bank (2010). Trade data stem from the World Development Indicators (2010). FDI flows are from the
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2010).
Consequently, the share of world trade to world GDP increased from 24%
in 1970 to 64% in 2008. Although the trade flows of developed and developing
economies have increased strongly, the share of total world trade of developing
economies has increased from 23% to 27%, emphasizing the growing importance
of these countries in the “new” global economy.2 Even more striking is the de-
velopment of FDI flows over recent decades.3 In 1970, total FDI flows amounted
to 48 billion USD only, with 35 billion USD in developed and 13 billion USD in
2Developed countries are all high-income countries and developing countries are all middle-
and low-income countries according to the definition of the World Bank (2010).
3FDI flows are measured as the sum of total inward FDI flows in the reporting economy.
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2010.
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developing countries. Since then, FDI flows in both country groups have exploded
with an average annual growth rate exceeding 12%, reaching its highest level in
2007 with more than 1,700 billion USD. Again, FDI flows have increased strongly
in both country groups and by 2008 FDI in developing economies amounted to
611 billion USD and in developed countries sum up to 827 billion USD respec-
tively.
These numbers highlight the dramatic change in the world economy and the
tremendous impact of globalization on firms and consumers around the world.
Firms were faced with new production opportunities and thereby they had to reor-
ganize their business models. On the one hand, the integration of low-wage coun-
tries allowed firms to relocate their production processes by slicing up the value
chain across different locations around the world (Helpman (1984), Helpman and
Krugman (1987)). On the other hand, the ongoing integration and availability of
new technologies allowed firms to serve consumers in foreign markets not only
via exporting, but also by setting up new production plants for final goods pro-
duction in the destination market (Brainard (1993), Helpman et al. (2004)). At the
same time, globalization has increased competition among firms, and developing
and designing new innovative products today is a key ingredient to survive in the
“new” global market. As a consequence, firms around the world have substan-
tially increased their R&D efforts in order to become a technology leaders in their
markets (Grossman and Helpman (1993), Bloom et al. (2011)). The surge in trade
flows has also had a strong effect on consumers by reducing product prices, be-
cause of competition and the integration of low-wage economies, and by increas-
ing the number of available products and product varieties. Consequently, con-
sumers today can choose from a larger and cheaper set of products compared with
the situation a few decades ago (Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2006)).
This change in the global economy gives rise to numerous interesting and
important questions on the effects of globalization on firms and consumers. In
this thesis I provide three empirical essays, which deliver new insights into and
provide answers on the questions how institutions and trade affect consumers and
firms acting in a global economy, thereby helping to further improve our under-
standing of the “new” global economy. In chapter 2 I address the question how
the availability of newly imported products, in the course of the ongoing glob-
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alization and European Integration process over the last decade, has positively
affected consumer welfare, and show which countries have benefited most from
access to new products. Chapter 3 analyzes how financial conditions affect the
decision of multinational firms whether to serve foreign markets via exporting or
by setting up an affiliate in the destination market and how this shapes the compo-
sition of export and FDI sales in an industry. Finally, chapter 4 studies the effect
of contracting institutions on R&D investments and shows how improvements in
the contracting environment in a country promote R&D investments and thereby
improve the innovative capacity of a country?
Chapter 2 is based on the observation that as a consequence of the ongoing
European Economic Integration process, trade flows within the European Union,
but also trade with non-European Union member states, have more than doubled
over the past decade.4 Because of the establishments of new trade linkages, this
process has raised the number of newly imported products by more than 18%,
indicating high gains for consumers.
In this chapter, we empirically test one of the fundamental prediction of the
“New Trade Theory” first outlined by Krugman (1979, 1980) and analyze to what
extent the increased availability of newly imported products has positively af-
fected consumer welfare in the 27 European Union member states for the period
from 1999 to 2008. To test this channel we build on the influential work of Feen-
stra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). In this framework, increasing the
share of newly available products increases consumer welfare, while reducing
available products generates consumer losses. We use a rich dataset of highly
disaggregated trade data at the eight-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature
product classification, which allows us to identify more than 8,000 different prod-
uct categories to structurally estimate the gains from imported variety.
Our results show that nearly all countries within the European Union have
gained significantly from the increase in newly imported products. However, our
results differ across countries and we find that the gains from variety are relatively
low for large and advanced economies, modest for small, developed economies
and high for the “new” member states of the European Union. For example, our
4This chapter was co-written by Lukas Mohler from the University of Basel.
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results suggest that gains from newly imported products in Latvia exceed more
than 3.0% of GDP for our considered period. When we decompose our results
according to the region of origin, we find that on average 70% of the gains stem
from intra-EU trade, highlighting the importance of the European Integration pro-
cess regarding trade flows and imported product variety and their positive effect
on consumer welfare.
In chapter 3, I study the impact of financial conditions on multinational firm
activity. This study is motivated by recent developments in exports and FDI flows
during the financial crises and prior findings in the literature that financial condi-
tions have sizeable effects on multinational firm activity. The question I address in
this analysis is to what extent financial conditions affect the composition of export
and FDI sales of multinational firms.
To answer this question, I develop a theoretical multi-country, multi-sector
model of international trade, where I integrate financial constraints into a model
of multinational firms developed by Brainard (1993) and Helpman et al. (2004).
In this model, firms can choose to serve foreign markets via exporting or FDI,
but need to raise external capital to finance their multinational activities. These
additional financing costs are higher for FDI than they are for exporting, given
the higher amount of credit required and the higher risks associated with FDI.
In addition, the ability of firms to raise external capital varies across industries,
and firms operating in financially vulnerable industries find it more difficult to
obtain external financing. As a result, the model predicts that firms operating
in financially vulnerable sectors more often choose to serve foreign markets via
exports instead of FDI given their limited ability to raise external capital for more
finance-intensive FDI strategies.
Based on the theoretical model, I develop an empirical strategy to test the
main predictions of the model. I construct a dataset for German firms that covers
26 manufacturing industries and 38 countries for the period 2002 to 2007 using
detailed information from the Midi (Microdatabase Direct Investment) database
and firm-level data from the AMADEUS database. I find evidence in the data that
financial frictions have a sizeable economic effect on the composition of export
and FDI sales. My estimates suggest that industries that are 10% less depen-
dent on external finance on average have a 3% to 5% lower ratio of exports to
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FDI sales. This result suggests that aside from traditional explanations from the
proximity-concentration literature, financial frictions are of similar importance for
the composition of multinational firm activity.
Finally, chapter 4 empirically analyzes how differences in institutions across
countries affect the compositions and levels of R&D investments. This chapter
is motivated by two empirical observations. First, we know from prior literature
that good institutions have an overall positive effect on economic development.
Second, we know that most of the differences in economic development stem from
differences in productivity and technical progress and that R&D investments play
a key role in the development of new technologies and innovations. Aside from
these observations, there is little empirical evidence about the underlying specific
channels generating these economic outcomes. In this chapter I fill this gap by
empirically analyzing the link between the quality of contracting institutions and
R&D investments at the country-industry level and provide new evidence about
how good institutions promote R&D investments.
To test this hypothesis, I develop an econometric framework that is based on
the insights of the incomplete contracts literature. In this type of models a final
goods producer and an input supplier agree to invest in R&D to develop and design
a new product or new technology. However, because of the relationship-specificity
of the R&D investments and existence of incomplete contracts, there is a classical
hold-up problem resulting in under-investments. This effect of under-investment
will be even more pronounced in industries that produce complex goods and there-
fore have a higher need of individually customized input goods and rely more
on good contracting institutions compared with other industries producing more
simple products. Since good contracting institutions in a country can mitigate
the potential negative effects resulting from the hold-up problem, countries with
good contracting institutions will have higher R&D investments and this effect is
higher, especially in those industries that rely more heavily on a good contracting
environment.
I develop a generalized difference-in-difference model to test this prediction
for a set of 29 OECD countries in 22 manufacturing industries for the period from
1996 to 2006. I find strong support in the data that contracting institutions have a
positive, highly significant and sizeable economic effect on the compositions and
6
levels of R&D investments. For example, if Korea were to improve its contracting
institutions to the level of Sweden, my estimates suggest that R&D investments in
the highly contract-intensive industry “Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers”
would increase from 1.95 billion USD to 2.67 billion USD. These results show
that the institutional environment in a country is a major determinant of R&D
investments and thereby supports the technological progress of a country.
Each of the three chapters analyzes different aspects that have and will con-
tinue to shape the ongoing globalization process. The results of this thesis deliver
fresh insights into the “new” global economy and help economists and policymak-
ers further improve their understanding of the effects of their decisions on firms
and consumers acting in the “new” global economy.
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Chapter 2
The Gains from Variety in the
European Union
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The Gains from Variety in the European Union
2.1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) with its 27 member states today constitutes the largest
single market in the world. Over the past decade, several historical events have
deepened the economic integration of economies within Europe but also of EU
member states into the world economy. First, the euro was introduced as book
money in 1999 and today is the official currency of 17 EU member states. Sec-
ond, the transition of the Eastern European economies from planned economies
to market economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain was accompanied by a surge
and redirection of trade flows towards the “old” member states as well as a strong
increase of trade between Eastern European countries themselves. This transition
led to the eastern enlargement in 2004, when ten new member states joined the
EU, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Finally, the EU and its member
states were confronted with the integration of fast-growing emerging markets into
the world trading system over the last decade, with China and other East Asian
economies at the forefront.
These dynamic processes of economic integration were paralleled by a strong
increase in trade flows for most member states. From 1999 to 2008 the total value
of imports for all EU countries combined has more than doubled. This surge in
trade flows was accompanied by an increase in the number of imported product
varieties available to consumers. The establishment of new trade linkages (new
goods and new trading partners) raised this number of imported varieties by 18%,
a value that suggests large gains for consumers as a result of newly available
products.
In this contribution, we adopt the methodology of Feenstra (1994) and Broda
and Weinstein (2006) to structurally estimate the gains from imported variety for
all 27 EU member states for the period from 1999 to 2008. We explore a rich
dataset of highly disaggregated trade data at the 8-digit level of the Combined
Nomenclature product classification (CN). The effects on consumer welfare of
newly available products are particularly interesting with regard to EU economies,
since the EU consists of several small and medium-sized economies with a high
degree of political and economic integration within the EU as well as within the
world economy. In addition, studying a variety of countries allows us to analyze
9
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and interpret results across different economies, adding another dimension to this
approach.
Our results can be summarized as follows. For most countries the gains from
variety are positive. However, the results largely differ across member states.
We identify three different groups of economies. First, for the largest four mem-
bers of the EU (in terms of GDP), the impact of imported variety is only slightly
above zero or even negative for the considered period. This can be explained by
small import shares and the fact that these economies were already well integrated
within the EU and the world economy in 1999. Secondly, for the smaller “old”
member states, we find modestly positive gains, all below 1% of GDP. Finally,
for the “new” member states of the EU, with the exception of Malta, the gains
from variety are strongly positive, mostly larger than 1% of GDP. For example,
variety gains in Latvia amount to 3.0% of GDP, which is of the same magnitude as
Broda and Weinstein (2006) find for the United States when examining the longer
period from 1972 to 2001. Our results imply that especially for fast-growing, less-
developed and smaller countries, the establishment of new trade linkages are an
important source of trade-based welfare gains. When we split up the gains regard-
ing regions of origin, we find that for a typical country about 70% of the gains
stem from intra-EU trade, indicating the importance of the European integration
process regarding trade flows and imported variety.
Our paper mainly contributes to two strands of the empirical trade literature.
First, we add to the literature on the “love for variety” motive, a key element of the
“New Trade Theory” laid out in the theoretical models of Krugman (1979, 1980,
1981). Contributions on this subject include, for example, Feenstra (1992) who
shows in a numerical example how trade barriers can affect the number of avail-
able products and reduce consumer welfare. Following this idea, Romer (1994)
calibrates a model with fixed export costs and finds that a substantial reduction in
trade barriers will lead to more exported varieties, resulting in an increase of GDP
of up to 20%. The first extensive empirical analysis of the variety gains from trade
was done by Broda and Weinstein (2006). These authors extend the methodology
developed by Feenstra (1994) to construct an artificial price index that measures
the impact of traded varieties on consumer welfare. Using highly disaggregated
trade data and the assumption that goods are differentiated across countries, they
10
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show that the growth in product variety has been an important source of welfare
gains. Covering U.S. import data from 1972 to 2001, their results suggest an
upward bias in the conventional price index of the magnitude of 1.2% per year,
which translates into an overall effect of 2.6% of GDP for the overall period. Put
differently, consumers are willing to pay roughly 0.1% of their annual income to
gains access to a larger set of goods and varieties. Similarly, and based on previ-
ous work by Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), Arkolakis et al. (2008) analyze
how trade liberalization in Costa Rica has affected product variety and consumer
welfare. They find, however, that the welfare increase after trade liberalization via
an extended product variety set is very limited, since new products are imported
in small quantities.1,2 In summary, some empirical evidence on the variety gains
from trade exists; it is, however, restricted to very few country analyses. With our
contribution, we add results for 27 countries to this literature.
Second, while the European integration process has attracted substantial in-
terest in the literature, the analysis of EU trade flows, and in particular of their
positive effects on consumer welfare, has been scarce. In the European trade lit-
erature three prominent lines can be identified. First, several studies have tried to
quantify the positive effect of the introduction of the euro on trade: see Baldwin
(2006) for a survey. Second, researchers have studied the effect of European inte-
gration and the role of national borders on intra-EU trade flows, including Nitsch
(2000) and Chen (2004). Finally, Buch and Piazolo (2001) and Manchin and
Pinna (2009) study the implications of the Eastern European enlargement in 2004
on growth and the redirection of trade flows towards the EU. All these studies
rely on aggregated trade data. A notable exception is Funke and Ruhwedel (2005)
who provide an empirical analysis of disaggregated trade data on export variety
and economic growth in Eastern European countries and find a high correlation
between increased imported variety and economic growth.3 However, none of the
papers in this literature covers the potential effect of variety changes on consumer
1For a more microeconomic perspective on the effects of new varieties on consumer, gains see
Hausman (1981), Hausman (1994), and Trajtenberg (1989).
2For a theoretical explanation of the increase in traded varieties, also see Yi (2003), Melitz
(2003), and Bernard et al. (2003).
3Other contributions investigate this relationship in an non-EU context, as for example Feenstra
and Markusen (1994), Broda et al. (2006), and Feenstra and Kee (2008).
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welfare. This is at the heart of our contribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
dataset and provide detailed descriptive statistics on the number of imported va-
rieties for all the member states. Section 3 briefly reviews the methodology de-
veloped by Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) to account for vari-
ety changes in import price indices, and Section 4 presents the results for the 27
members of the EU. Also, several robustness checks are carried out. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For our analysis, we use highly disaggregated trade data from Eurostat (2010) .
Approximately 10,000 product categories at the CN-8 level for the period from
1999 to 2008 are defined in this dataset.4 We use quarterly data from the first
quarter of 1999 to the first quarter of 2008 to rule out potential seasonality effects.
For each member state, we collect information on the value and quantity of all
imported products from all worldwide trading partners. The complete dataset
consists of more than 5 million observations.
2.2.1 Aggregate European Union Import Flows and Variety
We first present statistics on import flows at the aggregate EU level and for dif-
ferent country subgroups: Given the diverse structure of the EU economies and
their differences in terms of size (GDP), growth rate, import value and share, as
well as accession date, EU members were affected differently by the integration
process. We identify three different types of countries in the EU. First, the “large
old” economies including Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom with
the largest GDP in the EU, in sum accounting for over 60% of total EU GDP in
2008; second, the eleven “small old” high-income member states that had joined
the EU by 1995; and third, the twelve fast-growing, less-developed “new” mem-
4Table 2.7 in Appendix B provides some detailed information on the the product categories
defined in the Eurostat data.
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ber states, mostly from Eastern Europe, which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007,
respectively. These definitions are applied throughout our analysis.
From the first row in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.1, we can infer that
aggregate nominal import values of the EU member states from worldwide trading
partners have more than doubled from 487 billion euros in the first quarter of 1999
to 979 billion euros in the first quarter of 2008. Since one focus of our study
is to analyze trade flows within the EU, we split up total imports into imports
from other EU countries (internal imports) and imports from the rest of the world
(ROW, external imports) in rows two and three. We observe that trade within
the EU accounts for more than 60% of all imports. Both internal and external
trade flows have grown at rapid rates and roughly doubled in this period. This
strong increase in imports was accompanied by another effect, a strong increase
in the number of imported varieties. In our analysis, a good is defined as a CN-8
product category. Following Armington (1969), a variety is then assumed to be
a particular good imported from a particular country. Based on this definition,
we find a strong increase from 1.678 million to 1.970 million imported varieties
during the last decade (columns (1) and (2) of row four). About two-thirds of
imported varieties stem from EU internal imports (rows five and six). Given the
relatively small number of potential trading partners for a single product within
the EU, this is a large share and highlights the importance of intra-EU trade as a
source of new product varieties for consumers.5
In columns (3) to (8), we decompose the import flows according to our de-
fined country blocks. The “large four” economies account for nearly half of all
imports. Despite the strong growth in import value, the total number of imported
varieties increased modestly by 8% from roughly 457,000 to 497,000, indicating
that imports have grown at the intensive margin.6 While 65% of total imports
stem from the EU-27 member states, they account for 58% of imported varieties
in 1999. Both shares slightly decrease over time, emphasizing the growing im-
5Our dataset includes 189 countries. Hence, each member state is faced with 26 potential
internal trading partners in each product category and with 162 external ones.
6Growth at the intensive margins of trade is defined as an increase in value of existing varieties.
This is in line with the findings of Besedes and Prusa (2007) for high-income countries. Growth
at the extensive margin is defined as an increase in the number of varieties.
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Table 2.1: Aggregate Imports for each EU Subgroup, 1999-2008
“All-27” “Large four” “Small old” “New”
99 08 99 08 99 08 99 08
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value of imports in mil. EUR
World 487 979 277 485 179 372 31 122
EU-27 328 624 181 300 124 236 23 89
ROW 159 354 96 185 55 136 8 33
Number of imported varieties in th.
World 1,678 1,970 457 497 663 796 559 678
EU-27 1,078 1,274 265 281 446 505 367 488
ROW 600 697 192 216 217 291 192 189
Notes: Values in millions of euros. Number of varieties in thousands. A variety is defined as a particular good, defined
according to the CN-8 classification, imported from a particular country. All variables are calculated by aggregating
each individual variable for each of our defined subgroups for the first quarter in 1999 and the first quarter in 2008.
portance of trade with non-EU member states over the last decade. We obtain a
similar picture for the “small old” member states, although internal EU-27 imports
are even more important on average for these economies. In contrast to the “large
four”, imports have also substantially grown along the extensive margin. This in-
crease in variety is, to a large extent, due to trade with non-EU members. In this
category, the number of imported varieties has grown substantially from about
217,000 to 291,000. Finally, for the “new” member states, we obtain a somewhat
different picture. First, trade with other European member states is of central im-
portance for this group of countries and amounts to 70% of total imports. Second,
although the nominal import value from both EU and non-EU members in 2008
was roughly four times larger than in 1999, the fact that the number of varieties
imported from other EU members has grown by nearly 50% (from approximately
367,000 to 488,000), while the number of varieties from the rest of the world has
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been slightly decreasing (from about 192,000 to 189,000), is striking.7
2.2.2 Imported Variety of the European Union Member States
We now focus on country data to provide a more detailed picture of the evolution
of the imported variety set for each single member state. Given our assumption
that products are differentiated across countries, there are two potential sources
for new varieties. First, an entirely new good’s category can be imported, and
second, the number of supplying countries within an already imported category
can increase. Table 2.2 tabulates the number of imported goods (columns (1) and
(2)) and the average number of trading partners (columns (3) and (4)) that supply
these goods for all 27 EU members. Larger and high-income countries tend to
import a larger set of goods from a more diverse set of countries.8
From columns (1) and (2), we infer that for all but one of the “old” member
states, the number of imported product categories decreases slightly, while modest
to substantial increases have been realized by some of the “new” member states.
For example, in Latvia the number of product categories that have been imported
increased from 6,274 in 1999 to 7,228 in 2008. At the same time, columns (3) and
(4) reveal that the average number of supplying countries within available goods
has increased for all countries, except for Hungary and Malta. The relative in-
crease in the average number of supplying countries are modest in the four largest
members, but larger than 30% in many “small old” and “new” member states.
For example, in Romania the average number of supplying countries per product
category has grown from 6.50 to 9.30. Combining columns (1) to (4), this trans-
lates into an overall increase in imported varieties for all countries except Cyprus,
Hungary, and Malta, as can be inferred from columns (5) and (6).
7A further decomposition of the number of imported varieties at the country level has shown
that the main suppliers in terms of varieties of EU economies in 2008 were (in decreasing order)
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Belgium and the United States. The driving sup-
pliers of new varieties between 1999 and 2008 are China, Poland, the Czech Republic, Turkey,
Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and Hungary. Hence, besides established suppliers,
some emerging EU and non-EU economies have been the main contributors to the substantial
variety growth observed above.
8This is in line with the New Trade Theory first outlined by Krugman (1979) and with what
empirical studies by Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Broda and Weinstein (2004) have found.
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Table 2.2: Variety of EU-27 Imports from Worldwide Trading Partners, 1999-
2008
Total no. Mean no. Total no. Varieties
of goods of countries of varieties disapp. new.
1999 2008 1999 2008 1999 2008 1999 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
France 9,969 9,368 11.34 13.11 113,043 122,795 55,123 64,875
Germany 9,722 8,912 13.91 15.87 135,216 141,464 66,824 73,072
Great Brit. 9,562 9,090 11.38 13.32 108,857 121,124 55,849 68,1162
Italy 9,675 9,072 10.30 12.26 99,628 111,214 50,228 61,814
Austria 9,292 8,791 7.61 9.94 70,742 87,409 34,912 51,579
Belgium 9,685 9,073 8.35 11.09 80,894 100,596 38,008 57,710
Denmark 8,330 8,384 6.52 8.86 54,325 74,268 26,766 46,709
Finland 8,287 7,895 6.62 8.15 54,894 64,352 28,475 37,933
Greece 8,255 8,022 5.69 7.10 46,948 56,991 25,089 35,132
Ireland 8,375 7,947 4.30 5.57 36,046 44,271 20,267 28,492
Luxembourg 7,862 7,834 3.63 4.16 28,578 32,575 13,220 17,217
Netherlands 9,238 8,867 9.91 11.78 91,578 104,446 48,726 61,594
Portugal 8,529 8,429 6.07 6.93 51,779 58,399 26,714 33,334
Spain 9,345 8,931 7.72 9.92 72,127 88,585 35,272 51,730
Sweden 8,855 8,458 8.48 9.95 75,065 84,175 38,823 47,933
Bulgaria 6,649 7,509 5.15 7.16 34,229 53,758 19,986 39,515
Cyprus 5,951 5,932 5.12 5.13 30,477 30,407 20,120 20,050
Czech Rep. 8,848 8,598 8.54 9.55 75,568 82,106 41,095 47,633
Estonia 6,779 7,054 4.90 6.44 33,220 45,404 19,939 32,123
Hungary 7,049 6,805 9.46 9.37 66,689 63,757 40,403 37,471
Latvia 6,274 7,228 4.63 6.76 29,041 48,870 15,874 35,703
Lithuania 6,654 7,378 5.46 7.47 36,343 55,099 20,812 39,568
Malta 5,517 5,258 3.88 3.58 21,418 18,829 15,180 12,591
Poland 8,766 8,653 9.67 10.41 84,736 90,107 46,651 52,022
Romania 7,446 8,243 6.50 9.30 48,421 76,646 25,231 53,456
Slovakia 7,650 7,952 6.03 7.03 46,131 55,894 26,095 35,858
Slovenia 7,785 8,059 6.74 7.04 52,464 56,771 30,415 34,722
Notes: A good is defined after the CN-8 classification and a variety is defined as a good from a particular country.
The mean is calculated as the average country supplying a specific good category. The number of new (disappearing)
varieties is calculated as the number of all imported varieties that were not imported in the first quarter in 1999 (2008)
but were imported in the first quarter of 2008 (1999). Countries are arranged according to our definition of the three
subgroups of EU member states.
Our data show that the overall growth rate of new varieties has been relatively
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low for the “large old” economies, with an average increase of about 6%; more
substantial for the “small old” member states with growth rates of between 12%
and 36%; and even higher with growth rates of up to 68% in the case of Latvia,
and an average increase of roughly 35% for the “new” member states. The size
of the relative change in the number of imported varieties is depicted in the top
panel of Figure 2.1. Columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.2 display the turnover of
varieties in the member states during the considered decade. In many countries
the turnover rate is around 50% of the total number of varieties; that is, about 50%
of the varieties that existed in 1999 are no longer present in 2008 (column (7)), and
roughly 50% of the new varieties present in 2008 had not been available ten years
earlier (column (8)). This result qualitatively holds for all 27 members, although
in some “new” member states, the turnover rate is even higher. Thus, not only
has the absolute number of imported varieties increased, but also the origin and
composition of imported varieties has changed substantially over the last decade.
2.2.3 Variety Adjustments of Internal and External Imports
Figure 2.1 provides summary statistics on the contribution of internal and external
EU trade flows on the imported variety in each country. The top panel displays the
absolute number of new imported varieties, split up by the contribution of internal
and external trade flows.9 For example, in Denmark (DNK) the number of new
imported varieties amounts to 19,943, implying a relative increase of imported
varieties of 36%. Of this total, 7,774 varieties can be attributed to the import
of new varieties from non-EU member states and 12,169 to the import of new
varieties from EU member states. We observe that for most of the “old” EU
members the establishment of new trade linkages outside the EU accounts for
approximately 60% of new imported varieties. On the other hand, in many of the
new member states, more than 90% of new imported varieties stem from internal
EU trade partners. For some of the new member states such as Poland and the
Czech Republic, the number of imported varieties from non-EU member states is
even decreasing, an observation that is in line with the numbers from Table 2.110
9Netted out; i.e., disappearing varieties are subtracted from new varieties.
10This observation may hint at a trade diversion effect following the Eastern Enlargement in
2004. However, our interest lies in the analyzes of the variety gains given the realized trade flows.
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Figure 2.1: Adjustments in the Variety Set of EU Internal and External Imports
Notes: A good is defined after the CN-8 classification and a variety is defined as a good from a particular
country. For convenience we ordered the table according to our definition of our three subgroups of EU
member states from left to right. The top graph depicts the total change of EU internal and external imported
varieties. The lower two graphs further decompose the change in variety into the number of variety imported
from new trading partners or entirely new imported product categories.
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In the middle and bottom panel of Figure 2.1, we further decompose the con-
tribution of internal (middle panel) and external (bottom panel) trade flows; the
percentage change again depicts the relative change of imported varieties. We
split up the contribution along two dimensions. First, we calculate the number of
new imported varieties from product categories that have already been imported
in 1999 (New partners). Second, we compute the number of new imported va-
rieties due to imports of entirely new product categories, including all countries
supplying these products (New products). The middle panel analyzes the change
of internally traded varieties. For nearly all “old” members, over 90% of new in-
ternal varieties can be attributed to the emergence of entirely new products rather
than the increase in trading partners within already imported goods. For the “new”
member states, the EU has been an important source of both, new products and
new partners. For example, in Romania (ROM), the number of internally imported
varieties increased by 21,685 (a 66% relative increase). Of this total, 7,669 vari-
eties are due to imports from extending the set of trading partners within existing
product categories, and 14,016 varieties are due to imports of entirely new product
categories.
Finally, the bottom panel reveals that for the “old” EU-15 members, the num-
ber of imported varieties from non-EU countries has been increasing, mainly due
to imports of entirely new product categories.11 For example, in Italy (ITA) the
number of externally imported varieties has grown by 8,498 (a 22% relative in-
crease), whereof 5,870 new varieties can be attributed to imports of entirely new
product categories. On the other hand, for many of the Eastern European coun-
tries, the number of trading partners as well as the number of new products from
non-EU members has been unchanged or slightly decreased. In a nutshell, Fig-
ure 2.1 depicts a diverse pattern of extensive margin adjustments of the 27 EU
economies’ imports. Before turning to the empirical analysis, we lay out the
methodology used to analyse these variety changes.
11This seems to contradict the observation that the number of product categories mostly de-
creased in these countries (Table 2.1). However, new product categories were imported from more
countries than disappearing categories, which leads to this result.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we briefly review the methodology used to determine the gains
from variety. It was mainly developed by Feenstra (1994) and extended by Broda
and Weinstein (2006). We follow Feenstra (1994) to derive an exact price index for
a CES utility function for each imported good with a constant number of varieties.
This index is then extended by allowing for new and disappearing varieties. We
then aggregate the good’s indices to an aggregate import price index based on
the contribution of Broda and Weinstein (2006). We start with a simple CES
utility function with the following functional form for a single imported good. To
define a variety of a good, we assume that imports of one good g are treated as
differentiated across countries of supply, c. Consumers’ utility Mgt is defined as
Mgt =
(
∑
c∈C
dgctM
1−σg
gct
) 1
(1−σg)
;σg > 1, (2.1)
where C denotes the set of available countries, and hence of all potentially avail-
able varieties. Mgct is the subutility derived from the imported variety c of good g
in period t, and dgct > 0 is the corresponding taste or quality parameter. The elas-
ticity of substitution among varieties is given by σg and is assumed to be larger
than one. Using standard cost minimization gives us the minimum unit-cost func-
tion
φgt(Igt , ~dgt) =
(
∑
c∈Igt
dgct(pgct)1−σg
) 1
1−σg
, (2.2)
where pgct is the price of variety c of good g in period t, and ~dgt is the vector of
taste or quality parameters. Igt ⊂C is the subset of varieties of good g imported
at time t. Suppose the set of available product varieties Igt in period t and t−1 is
identical, the taste parameters ~dgt are also constant over time, and~xt and~xt−1 are
the cost-minimizing consumption bundle vectors for the varieties of one good for
the given price vectors. In this case, Diewert (1976) defines an exact price index
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as the ratio of the minimum cost functions
Pg(~pgt ,~pgt−1,~xgt ,~xgt−1, Ig) =
φgt(Ig, ~dg)
φgt−1(Ig, ~dg)
, (2.3)
where the price index does not depend on the unknown taste parameters ~dgt . Sato
(1976) and Vartia (1976) have derived the exact price index for our CES unit-cost
function. It can be written as the geometric mean of the individual price changes
Pg(~pgt ,~pgt−1,~xgt ,~xgt−1, Ig) =∏
c∈Ig
(
pgct
pgct−1
)wgct
, (2.4)
where the weights are calculated using the following expenditure shares:
wgct =
(
sgct−sgct−1
lnsgct−lnsgct−1
)
∑cεIg
(
sgct−sgct−1
lnsgct−lnsgct−1
) , (2.5)
sgct =
pgctxgct
∑cεIg pgctxgct
. (2.6)
So far, we have assumed that all varieties of one good are available in both periods.
The price index developed by Feenstra (1994) allows us to incorporate new and
disappearing product varieties. The effects of a change in the variety set are given
by the following proposition.
Proposition: For every good g, if dgct = dgct−1 for c ∈ Ig = ((Igt ∩ Igt−1); Ig 6= /0,
then the exact price index for good g with change in varieties is given by
Πg(~pgt ,~pgt−1,~xgt ,~xgt−1, Ig) =
φgt(Igt , ~dg)
φgt(Igt−1, ~dg)
(2.7)
= Pg(~pgt ,~pgt−1,~xgt ,~xgt−1, Ig)
(
λgt
λgt−1
) 1
σg−1
,(2.8)
where
λgr =
∑cεIg pgcrxgcr
∑cεIgr pgcrxgcr
; r = t, t−1. (2.9)
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The idea of the Feenstra (1994) index is to correct the conventional price index
Pg by multiplying it with an additional term which measures the influence of new
and disappearing varieties and is called the lambda ratio. The numerator λgt mea-
sures the impact of new varieties: Varieties available at t, but not at t−1 (i.e., new
varieties), are comprised in the set Igt but not in the set Ig, and therefore expendi-
tures on such varieties lower λgt . Analogously, expenditures on varieties available
at, t − 1 but not at t (i.e., disappearing varieties) lower the term λgt−1. Hence,
the price index is corrected downward if expenditure on new varieties is relatively
large and expenditure on disappearing varieties is relatively small. Furthermore,
a high elasticity of substitution causes the term ( λtλt−1)
1
σ−1 to approach unity and,
consequently, dampens the effect of the lambda ratio on the price index. This is
intuitive, since new and disappearing products will only have a minor influence on
the welfare of consumers if close substitutes exist. We use the methodology pro-
posed by Feenstra (1994) in our empirical analysis to obtain consistent estimates
for the elasticity of substitution, see Appendix A. Having derived the exact price
index for one good, we can now aggregate the imported goods to an aggregate
import price index as in Broda and Weinstein (2006). This is done by building
a geometric mean of the price indices. The aggregate import price index is then
given by
Π(~pt ,~pt−1,~xt ,~xt−1, I) =
[
∏
g∈G
Pg(.)
(
λgt
λgt−1
)(1/σg−1)]wgt
, (2.10)
= CIPI(I)∏
g∈G
(
λgt
λgt−1
)wgt/(σg−1)
, (2.11)
where the weights wgt are analogously defined as in (2.5) and (2.6). Equation
(2.11) shows that the aggregate exact import price index is the product of the
conventional import price index, CIPI(I), and the aggregated lambda ratios. The
factor correcting the conventional import price index can thus be expressed by
the ratio of the corrected import price index and the conventional import price
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index—called the endpoint ratio (EPR).
EPR=
ΠM
CIPI(I)
=∏
g
(
λgt
λgt−1
)wgt/(σg−1)
. (2.12)
Using a simple Krugman (1980) structure of the economy, the inverse of the EPR
can be weighted by the share of imports on the GDP to obtain the gains from
variety (GFV):
GFV =
[
1
EPR
]wMt
−1, (2.13)
where wMt is the import share.
2.4 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the variety gains estimates for the EU
member states. We also show where these gains originate geographically and
provide some robustness measures.
2.4.1 The Gains from Variety in the the European Union
In the first step of our calculation, we use equation (2.9) to calculate the lambda
ratios for each imported product category of each country. The lambda ratios are
a more precise measure of variety growth than the count data used in Table 2.2,
since they take the consumer budget decision into account by using expenditure
shares as weights. Summary statistics for these ratios are presented in Table 2.3:12
For example, the median lambda ratio for Ireland is 0.96 < 1, implying that the
typical imported product category in Ireland experienced a positive variety growth
12There are fewer lambda ratios calculated than product groups: Some lambda ratios cannot be
defined at the CN-8 level, since there is no common variety at the beginning and the end of the
chosen time period. In this case, we follow Broda and Weinstein (2006) and define the lambda ratio
at the SITC-5 or even the SITC-3 level. The sigma for these categories is obtained by calculating
the weighted average of all corresponding CN-8 sigmas. Hence, we use all sigmas estimated at
the CN-8 level.
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of about 4%.13
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Lambda Ratios, EU-27
Nobs Mean Median 5% 95%
France 1,795 1.27 0.99 0.43 1.83
Germany 1,573 1.25 0.99 0.38 1.88
Great Britain 1,304 1.16 0.98 0.31 1.75
Italy 1,627 1.16 0.98 0.33 1.90
Austria 1,435 1.27 0.99 0.36 2.11
Belgium 1,613 1.31 0.98 0.29 1.90
Denmark 1,097 1.46 0.97 0.27 2.07
Finland 1,206 1.64 0.97 0.18 2.79
Greece 1,172 1.25 0.95 0.19 2.27
Ireland 1,319 1.33 0.96 0.23 3.11
Luxembourg 1,264 1.36 1.00 0.28 1.91
Netherlands 1,450 1.28 0.98 0.23 2.13
Portugal 1,240 1.34 0.99 0.27 2.42
Spain 1,412 1.17 0.96 0.21 2.00
Sweden 1,225 1.20 0.97 0.28 2.02
Bulgaria 681 1.08 0.81 0.11 2.27
Cyprus 506 1.77 0.97 0.17 3.75
Czech Republic 1,245 1.42 0.98 0.22 2.79
Estonia 717 1.51 0.90 0.12 2.99
Hungary 764 1.68 1.00 0.21 3.19
Latvia 654 1.20 0.79 0.09 3.01
Lithuania 813 1.15 0.83 0.08 2.28
Malta 540 1.90 1.00 0.17 6.19
Poland 1,221 1.56 0.99 0.21 2.94
Romania 871 1.54 0.86 0.13 2.93
Slovakia 850 1.36 0.96 0.17 2.56
Slovenia 992 1.53 0.97 0.24 2.92
Notes: 5% and 95% denote the respective percentiles. Goods are defined at the CN-8 level and the
number of observations denotes the number of calculated lambda ratios according to equation (2.9).
Outliers larger than 100 are dropped. This concerns 81 lamba ratios out of the total of 30,000 ratios
calculated. Countries are arranged according to our definition of the three subgroups of EU member
states.
In the largest four EU economies, the average growth in imported variety has
13Calculated as 1/0.96=4.2%.
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been moderate, with median lambda ratios of 0.98 or 0.99, indicating a weighted
variety growth of 1% or 2%. In the “small old” member states, the median lambda
ratios range from 0.95 in the case of Greece to 1.00 for Luxembourg. The “new”
member states have experienced a higher increase in imported varieties. The me-
dian lambda ratio can be as low as 0.79 in Latvia or 0.81 in Bulgaria, indicating
a variety growth of up to 25%. Exceptions are Malta, Hungary, and Poland with
median lambda ratios of 0.99 or 1.00. From the quantiles displayed in the last two
columns of Table 2.3, it can be inferred that there is substantial variation across
product categories with respect to variety growth.
As pointed out by our theoretical framework, this observed variety growth
does not directly imply an increase in consumer welfare, since the degree of sub-
stitutability within the different product categories is essential in our model. For
example, the availability of a new variety of car fuel is expected to have a low
impact on consumer welfare, since fuel is a homogeneous good. Within a CES
framework, this homogeneity is expressed by a high value of the elasticity of sub-
stitution. On the other hand, consumers do care about different varieties within
differentiated product groups, such as footwear, furniture or automobiles. Conse-
quently, these product categories exhibit low elasticities of substitution, and there-
fore new varieties in these product categories lower the price index substantially.14
We estimate the elasticities of substitution for every imported product category of
each country following Feenstra (1994). Table 2.4 reports descriptive statistics
of the estimated elasticities.15 Our estimation of the elasticities of substitution
reveals that the median elasticity of countries ranges from 3.41 to 4.89. These val-
ues are of similar magnitude as those obtained in other studies, as for example in
Broda and Weinstein (2006), Broda et al. (2006) or Berry et al. (1995). Based on
the assumption of a Krugman-type economy, this translates into median markups
14We test whether these presumptions about the elasticities of homogeneous and differentiated
goods are true. See below.
15A total of 2,093 estimated elasticities in Malta may seem too few, considering that this country
imported 5,517 goods in 1999 alone. However, some product categories in very small countries are
imported from very few trading partners and for only a very short time span. For these goods, it is
not possible to estimate the elasticities of substitution. See Feenstra (1994) for more information
about this estimation technique. In the calculation of the variety gains below, we replace the
missing elasticities at the CN-8 level by estimates at the CN-4 product level.
25
The Gains from Variety in the European Union
of between 25% and 42%.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics: Elasticities of Substitution, EU-27
Nobs Mean StE Median 5% 95%
France 10,491 11.29 0.83 4.22 1.87 22.15
Germany 10,191 10.78 0.89 4.67 2.16 22.82
Great Britain 9,929 9.25 0.85 3.84 1.77 18.83
Italy 9,797 14.28 1.42 4.60 1.94 26.84
Austria 8,316 8.27 0.48 3.70 1.61 18.90
Belgium 9,338 8.53 0.40 4.10 1.75 21.51
Denmark 7,631 7.94 0.55 3.42 1.51 19.21
Finland 6,764 12.44 0.90 4.04 1.66 25.06
Greece 6,728 9.04 0.72 3.41 1.47 20.99
Ireland 6,210 10.80 1.29 3.47 1.49 19.53
Luxembourg 5,173 13.70 1.40 3.51 1.36 30.92
Netherlands 8,696 12.06 1.01 4.38 1.72 26.99
Portugal 7,182 12.03 1.47 3.65 1.58 21.38
Spain 9,179 9.05 0.53 3.89 1.68 20.97
Sweden 7,722 9.83 0.53 4.32 1.79 22.54
Bulgaria 5,314 12.63 1.30 4.57 1.70 30.36
Cyprus 2,814 20.13 4.19 4.56 1.60 37.37
Czech Republic 7,525 12.14 1.19 4.33 1.73 25.86
Estonia 4,695 14.39 1.70 4.18 1.60 27.72
Hungary 6,914 13.61 0.94 4.52 1.76 30.57
Latvia 4,542 13.16 1.49 4.33 1.66 30.65
Lithuania 5,137 11.26 0.74 4.50 1.70 31.19
Malta 2,093 8.89 0.69 3.59 1.40 22.70
Poland 8,129 13.02 1.19 4.31 1.80 28.09
Romania 6,436 13.49 0.78 4.89 1.76 36.49
Slovakia 6,189 10.60 0.77 3.98 1.53 26.70
Slovenia 6,328 10.01 0.68 4.07 1.60 24.64
Notes: 5% and 95% denote the respective percentiles. Elasticities are estimated at the goods level, which is defined
at the CN-8 level. Outlier elasticities larger than 10,000 are dropped. This concerns 15 elasticities out of the total
of 190,000 elasticities estimated. Countries are arranged according to our definition of the three subgroups of EU
member states.
The last two columns of Table 2.4 show the 5% and 95% percentiles, indicat-
ing large differences across products regarding the substitutability of varieties. In
the case of Sweden, for example, 5% of all elasticities are higher than 22.54. Such
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high values imply almost perfectly homogeneous varieties from the viewpoint of
a CES consumer.
We test whether our estimated elasticities are sensible from a practical point of
view. First, we categorize them according to the classification of Rauch (1999).16
We find that our estimates fit the expectations well: Homogeneous product cat-
egories exhibit a median elasticity of 4.8, reference priced products of 4.3, and
differentiated products of 4.0. This also holds for the individual countries in our
dataset. Second, we estimate the elasticities at different product aggregation lev-
els; i.e., CN-6 and CN-4. We find that the elasticities tend to decrease in broader
defined product categories. These results strengthen our confidence in our elastic-
ity estimates.
Our results do not suggest any apparent systematic differences between me-
dian elasticities across different countries; e.g., between small and large or be-
tween “old” and “new” member states. This is noteworthy, given the different
structure of the EU economies in terms of size, growth rate and development.
Hence, our results do not lend direct support to recent theoretical models, as for
example Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
Using our estimated elasticities of substitution and the lambda ratios, we cal-
culate the corrected price indices following equation (2.8) for each of the product
categories in all member states. Following equation (2.11), these indices are then
aggregated into the corrected import price index. The ratio of the conventional
import price index and the corrected import price index then results in the EPR as
displayed by equation (2.12). We obtain the bias in the conventional import price
index (in the following simply referred to as the “bias”) by calculating 1/EPR−1.
The EPR and the bias are depicted in Table 2.5. For example, a bias of 3.66% in
Estonia implies that the conventional import price index overstates the actual price
evolution by 3.66%, by not taking the change in the variety set into account. Fi-
nally, by weighting the bias by the import share as in equation (2.13), we obtain
the GFV expressed as a percentage of GDP.
16Rauch (1999) classifies goods as homogeneous if they are traded on organized exchanges, as
reference priced if the goods can be identified by referring to list prices, meaning that prices can be
quoted without mentioning the name of the manufacturer, and as differentiated if products differ
over a multitude of dimensions including, for example, a brand name or the place of selling.
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Table 2.5: Import Price Index and the Gains from Variety, EU-27
Import
EPR Bias Share GFV
France 1.001 -0.06% 0.24 -0.01%
Germany 1.001 -0.12% 0.26 -0.03%
Great Britain 0.997 0.34% 0.21 0.07%
Italy 0.993 0.73% 0.21 0.15%
Austria 0.992 0.79% 0.41 0.32%
Belgium 0.994 0.61% 0.84 0.51%
Denmark 0.976 2.47% 0.30 0.72%
Finland 1.002 -0.20% 0.29 -0.06%
Greece 0.995 0.46% 0.25 0.11%
Ireland 0.991 0.89% 0.38 0.33%
Luxembourg 0.999 0.12% 0.56 0.07%
Netherlands 0.990 1.00% 0.51 0.51%
Portugal 0.990 1.03% 0.34 0.35%
Spain 0.983 1.73% 0.26 0.46%
Sweden 0.993 0.71% 0.30 0.21%
Bulgaria 0.972 2.85% 0.53 1.50%
Cyprus 0.979 2.15% 0.38 0.80%
Czech Republic 0.986 1.42% 0.65 0.93%
Estonia 0.965 3.66% 0.76 2.76%
Hungary 0.979 2.09% 0.62 1.30%
Latvia 0.945 5.84% 0.52 3.02%
Lithuania 0.982 1.87% 0.60 1.12%
Malta 1.037 -3.60% 0.69 -2.49%
Poland 0.990 0.97% 0.35 0.34%
Romania 0.971 2.98% 0.43 1.28%
Slovakia 0.977 2.34% 0.79 1.84%
Slovenia 0.981 1.90% 0.60 1.13%
Notes: Estimates are based on the definition of a good at the CN-8 level. A variety is defined
as a particular good from a particular country. The endpoint endpoint ratio (EPR) is calculated
according to equation 2.12 and the gains from variety (gfv) is based on equation 2.13, where the
import share is the ratio of imports to GDP. Countries are arranged according to our definition of
the three subgroups of EU member states.
The biases in the “large four” countries are small in magnitude. In the case of
France and Germany, they are even slightly negative, implying an increase in the
import price index and hence a consumer loss through variety. Given the relatively
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small import shares of these large economies, this translates into small gains or
losses from imported varieties, not substantially different from zero.
In the “small old” economies of the EU, we observe that the conventional
import price index is biased upwards in all countries except in the case of Finland,
where the bias is negative, but close to zero. The magnitude of the biases is larger
on average than in the “large four” economies, with Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden experiencing a bias of more than 0.7%
over the considered time span. Weighting the biases with the generally higher
import shares results in GFV that mostly lie between 0.2% and 0.75% of GDP.
GFV for consumers remain limited in these countries.
In all “new” member states—with the exception of Malta—the change in the
variety set translates into lower import prices as shown by the positive biases. The
magnitude of the correction in the price index is much larger than in the “old”
member states, with Estonia and Latvia experiencing lower import prices of over
3%, while in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia, the bias is larger than
2%. For Poland, we observe the lowest positive bias with 0.96%. Consumers
in these countries have thus profitted from lower import prices to a greater extent
than consumers of the “old” member states. Expressed relative to total production,
the gains amount to as much as 3.02% of GDP in the case of Latvia. High GFV
above 1.5% of GDP are also found in Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovakia. Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia exhibit modest gains
that still lie above 0.8% of GDP. In Poland, the GFV are small with only 0.34% of
GDP—a result also driven by the relatively low import share. Such variety gains
can be interpreted in the following way. Consumers in Latvia are willing to spend
3.02% of their GDP in the year 2008 to gain access to the larger set of imported
varieties available in 2008 compared to the set of varieties available in 1999.
2.4.2 Geographical Origin of the Gains from Variety
In a next step, we analyze whether the GFV stem from internal EU trade or from
trade with countries outside the EU. The methodology presented in Section 2.3
allows us to compute the EPR for each trading partner, or, more appropriately
here, the EPR stemming from trade with a group of countries. For each country
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group i, in our case the EU and ROW, the EPR is computed as follows:
EPRi =∏
g
[(
λgt
λgt−1
)(wgt/(σg−1))Wigt]
, (2.14)
whereWigt is the ideal log-change weight of country group i on good g. By multi-
plying both EPRi, the total EPR as reported in Table 2.5 is obtained. In our case,
EPR= EPREUEPRROW . (2.15)
The bias in the price index can then be calculated as described above and the
results for all 27 EU members are given in Table 2.6. Columns (1) and (2) depict
the EPR resulting from the imports from other EU member states and from the
ROW, respectively, while columns (3) and (4) display the bias in the import price
index resulting from these imports.17 For example, Greek consumers gain from
the change in the variety set imported from its EU trading partners, expressed by
a bias of 1.16%, depicted in column (3). At the same time, Greece loses from
the change in imported variety of its ROW trading partners—with a negative bias
in the import price index of -0.69%, as displayed in column (4). In Latvia, the
country with the highest gains from variety, the upward bias of the import price
index is 5.18% considering just imports from other EU members, but only 0.63%
regarding ROW imports. Hence, the GFV predominantly stem from intra-EU
trade.
Most countries experience lower import prices due to both variety imports
from other EU members and from ROW countries. However, in all these coun-
tries, the upward bias stemming from internal imports is much higher than from
external imports.18
17To calculate this bias, we make the implicit assumption that when the variety set supplied by
EU countries changes, the composition of ROW imports remains the same—and vice versa.
18Again, this seems to contrast with some results from the descriptive analysis, especially for
the “old” members where we have seen that the greater part of the variety count increase stems
from ROW countries. However, these statistics neglect the weighting of varieties. Varieties from
EU countries are often imported at greater value than ROW varieties. The results highlight the
necessity of relying on more sophisticated variety measures instead of using simple count data.
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Table 2.6: Geographical Origin of the Gains from Variety, EU-27
EPR Bias
EU ROW EU ROW
France 1.001 1.000 -0.06% 0.01%
Germany 1.000 1.001 0.03% -0.15%
Great Britain 0.997 1.000 0.34% 0.00%
Italy 0.995 0.998 0.50% 0.24%
Austria 0.993 0.999 0.72% 0.08%
Belgium 0.994 1.000 0.59% 0.02%
Denmark 0.980 0.995 2.00% 0.47%
Finland 0.997 1.005 0.26% -0.46%
Greece 0.989 1.007 1.16% -0.69%
Ireland 0.992 0.999 0.84% 0.05%
Luxembourg 0.998 1.001 0.22% -0.11%
Netherlands 0.994 0.996 0.58% 0.42%
Portugal 0.992 0.998 0.80% 0.23%
Spain 0.992 0.991 0.84% 0.89%
Sweden 0.994 0.998 0.56% 0.15%
Bulgaria 0.979 0.993 2.17% 0.66%
Cyprus 0.989 0.990 1.14% 0.99%
Czech Republic 0.986 1.000 1.46% -0.04%
Estonia 0.971 0.993 2.95% 0.70%
Hungary 0.987 0.992 1.33% 0.76%
Latvia 0.951 0.994 5.18% 0.63%
Lithuania 0.984 0.998 1.64% 0.22%
Malta 1.027 1.010 -2.61% -1.02%
Poland 0.992 0.999 0.83% 0.13%
Romania 0.976 0.995 2.44% 0.53%
Slovakia 0.979 0.998 2.11% 0.23%
Slovenia 0.983 0.998 1.69% 0.21%
Notes: Estimates are based on the definition of a good at the CN-8 level. A variety is defined
as a particular good from a particular country. The endpoint endpoint ratio (EPR) is calculated
according to equation 2.12 and the bias as defined in the text. Both variables are calculated for
EU-27 member states and for the rest od the world respectively. Countries are arranged according
to our definition of the three subgroups of EU member states.
Other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Luxembourg and Finland gain
from the higher variety from intra-EU trade, but lose part of these gains due to the
lower variety imported from ROW countries. In Finland, this loss dominates the
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gains.19
2.4.3 Interpretation of the Results
Our results can be summarized as follows: The average bias of the import price
index (the total GFV) for the “large four” amounts to 0.18% (0.04%).20 Internal
EU trade flows contributed about 60% to this low value. For the “smaller old”
member states, we estimate positive gains with an average bias in the price import
index (total GFV) of 1.11% (0.39%). Although these countries profited from both,
internal and external imports, our results show that more than 70% of the gains can
be attributed to imports from other EU members. Finally, in the “new” member
states the upward bias of the import price index (the total GFV) amounts to 1.74%
(0.92%) on average. These countries have benefited substantially from internal
EU trade over the last decade. Internal trade accounts for about 85% of the total
gains from imported varieties.
One explanation for this pattern of the gains from variety makes use of the
ongoing process of European integration as well as globalization in general: The
“large four” countries already played a key role in the global economy at the
beginning of the observation period and had well-established trade links within
the EU as well as within the global trading system. Consequently, access to new
varieties via important new trade linkages was limited, given their already diverse
structure of imports in 1999. Hence, we observe that most trade was growing at the
intensive margin, resulting in relatively low variety gains. Besides these reasons,
the smaller import shares also play a role in these countries when calculating the
gains from variety.
For the high-income, “small old” member states, we observe in Section 2 that
import diversity is somewhat more limited compared with the largest economies.
The increase over the last decade, however, has been more substantial and their
large import shares make imports, and the imported variety of products in par-
19One exception is Malta. This country experiences variety losses from both blocks, the losses
from EU trading partners being larger in magnitude.
20We calculate the weighted average bias of the import price index using the size of each country
in terms of its GDP. This is done to obtain a clearer picture of the differences between the three
country blocks.
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ticular, an important source of welfare gains. At the same time, trade of these
countries with other EU members was already well diversified by the year 1999,
with the EU being a particularly important source of imports for decades. These
countries were part of the EU for a longer period and had already adopted impor-
tant institutions like the single market program before 1999. This also explains the
slower growth rate of new trade linkages within the EU trade network compared to
the higher growth rate of trade linkages with non-EU trading partners as described
in Section 2. However, our analysis shows that when using the more sophisticated
structural estimation technique, most of the gains from variety actually stem from
new imported varieties from EU trading partners. This can be explained by the
fact that most of the new imported varieties from non-EU partners were imported
at relatively low values.
The “new” member countries, on the other hand, were less well integrated
within the world trading system and the EU in 1999 and consequently took ad-
vantage of the dynamic globalization process over the last decade to diversify
and extend their imported variety set. Our results imply that most of the gains
stem from internal EU imports—the descriptives statistics in Section 2 have al-
ready shown that new trade linkages were established predominantly with other
EU members. With the reorientation of the transition economies towards “old”
Europe in combination with the reduction in trade barriers and the adoption of
important institutions of the EU during the accession period, the trade linkages
of these countries with all the other EU-27 members have grown at a rapid rate,
resulting in substantial consumer welfare gains via the existence of a more diverse
set of products and varieties.
2.4.4 Robustness of the Results
The empirical approach used in our study rests on a few strong assumptions. One
potential issue is the dependence of the results on the estimated elasticities of sub-
stitution. Secondly, the trade dataset used for our analysis dictates that a particu-
lar definition of an imported variety is adopted, which, in turn, drives the results.
Third, since the methodology used above only focuses on imported varieties and
neglects changes in the domestic variety, we provide a short discussion on how
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this simplification may influence our results.
Estimating elasticities of substitution from trade data is a difficult task. Due
to the data restrictions, several strong assumptions have to be made to identify this
parameter. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this in detail.21 To assess
the impact of the estimated elasticities on our results, we keep the elasticities for
each country and each product group constant at different levels and calculate the
variety gains using a fixed elasticity of σ = 3, σ = 4, σ = 6 or σ = 8. Under
all specifications, the qualitative implications of our results presented above con-
tinue to hold. The “large four” exhibit the lowest gains, close to zero for all four
countries. Gains in the “small old” members are positive—with the exception of
Finland—but lower than the gains in the “new” member states. For example, us-
ing σ = 6, Estonian consumers enjoy variety gains amounting to 2.32% (down
from 2.76% using the estimated elasticities) of GDP, while in the Netherlands and
in Great Britain the gains amount to 0.59% (0.59%) and 0.10% (0.07%). Hence,
the observed differences between countries predominantly stem from fundamental
differences in the import variety set as observed in the trade data.22
In our contribution, a variety is defined as a particular good imported from a
particular country. Blonigen and Soderbery (2010) argue that the variety definition
imposed by conventional trade data hides some variety growth. Using a detailed
market data set on the U.S. automobile market, the authors show that the gains
from variety double if more disaggregated variety definitions (i.e., different car
brands and models) are used. Bernard et al. (2009) comment in the same vein
and argue that new (and still scarce) firm-level data imply higher variety gains
from trade, since every firm produces several different varieties. From this point
of view, our results provide a conservative measure for the GFV.
Given the data restrictions, we cannot assess how a more detailed variety def-
21Interested readers are referred to Feenstra (1991), which is the more detailed working paper
version of Feenstra (1994), as well as to an appendix available on Robert C. Feenstra’s website.
Furthermore, Soderbery (2010) discusses several of the properties of the employed estimator.
22This is not to say that country- and product-specific elasticities are not important for finding
the true gains. In fact, the distribution of product-specific elasticities is highly skewed and thus
it is hard to justify an “average” elasticity that is applied on all products. For example, Broda
and Weinstein (2006) show that by using the median elasticity instead of the full distribution, the
variety gains are overestimated by 100%.
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inition might affect our results. However, we can re-estimate the variety gains
using different aggregation levels of the trade data; e.g., CN-6, to analyze how
less detailed data influence our results. For this purpose, we also re-estimate the
elasticities of substitution to match them with the now broader product categories.
The variety gains turn out to be robust to a change in the product definition from
CN-8 to CN-6. For example, in Estonia the GFV decrease from 2.76% to 2.62%
of GDP; in Italy, they remain at 0.15%; and in Belgium welfare gains slightly in-
crease from 0.51% to 0.67%. Hence, even though varieties are now more broadly
defined and some variety growth captured at the CN-8 level is excluded, our re-
sults remain robust. One explanation for this result is the fact that the elastici-
ties of substitution generally decrease if products are defined in a broader manner.
Hence, by using less disaggregated data, we potentially miss some variety growth.
However, the broader defined varieties are estimated as being more differentiated,
and this has an opposite effect on our estimated gains.
More importantly, we observe that although we use different variety defini-
tions, the qualitative assessments discussed above—for example that “new” mem-
bers gain more from imported variety—remain the same.23
Using the model described in Section 2, we implicitly assume that domesti-
cally produced and imported goods cannot be substituted. A change in the variety
of imported goods does not affect the domestic economy, or more specifically,
the variety of domestically produced goods. The same stark assumption is used
by Broda and Weinstein (2006). Several contributions address this issue theoret-
ically. For example in Melitz (2003), more productive foreign firms crowd out
less productive domestic firms, leading to a decrease in domestically produced
varieties. As Arkolakis et al. (2008) or Baldwin and Forslid (2010) show, the total
number of varieties consumed in a country can even decrease after trade liberal-
ization in such a model.24
23We also perform the exercise using product categories defined at CN-4. The qualitative results
remain the same. However, GFV generally decrease using this definition which only defines about
1,000 products. Thus, the missed variety growth lowers the gains, while the lower elasticities do
not fully compensate this decrease.
24Of course, one still has to weight these varieties by the expenditure shares. Thus, these re-
sults themselves do not imply that the gains from variety would be negative. In fact, Feenstra
(2010) shows that using the Melitz (2003) model, gains from imported variety and losses from
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In a recent contribution, Ardelean and Lugovskyy (2010) address this issue
empirically by setting up a simple model, in which domestically produced and im-
ported varieties can be substituted. Depending on the magnitude of the elasticities
and relative productivity of the domestic sectors, domestic varieties are assumed
to be replaced by imported varieties upon trade liberalization. The authors quan-
tify a potential bias resulting from ignoring this possible substitution and find that
the bias of the price index is not more than 8% in U.S. manufacturing.25 It is dif-
ficult to say how this result relates to the gains found for the countries of the EU.
Member states differ in various aspects that determine the potential crowding-out
of domestically produced varieties. Further research is needed beyond the scope
of this paper to address these important questions.
2.5 Conclusion
Over the last decade, the member states of the EU have been part of a dynamic
economic integration process within Europe as well at a global level, resulting
in a strong increase in imported products and varieties. In this paper, we adopt
the methodology outlined by Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006) to
estimate the effects of variety growth on consumer welfare for all EU member
states for the period from 1999 to 2008.
Our results show that for most countries the import price index is biased up-
wards due to the omission of newly imported varieties. This gives rise to positive
welfare gains to consumers stemming from an increased product variety. How-
ever, our analysis also reveals substantial differences across countries. Based on
the assumption of a Krugman-type economy, we were unable to identify any siz-
able gains from newly imported varieties for the largest four countries of the EU
over the last decade. The gains are more substantial for the smaller and espe-
cially the younger member states of the EU. Our results suggest positive welfare
gains of 3% of GDP in the case of Latvia. Especially for smaller and fast-growing
domestically produced varieties have to cancel each other out.
25Concentrating on the automobile sector, Blonigen and Soderbery (2010) show that by tak-
ing domestically produced automobiles from foreign affiliates in the United States into account,
variety gains even increase by an additional 70%.
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economies, the creation and extension of trade linkages thus present an important
source of welfare, a fact often neglected in the discussion about the positive effects
of globalization and economic integration.
To shed further light on the source of these gains, we identify to what extent
intra-EU and non-EU imports contribute to the gains from variety. Our analysis
shows that the majority of the welfare gains can be attributed to increased variety
imports from other EU members. Imports from non-EU countries did not con-
tribute much to the gains; on the contrary, according to our results these imports
often even contributed negatively, thus mitigating the positive effects of variety
growth in the total imports. These results prove to be reasonably robust under
several different specifications.
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A Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Estimation of the Elasticity of Substitution
We briefly review the estimator developed by Feenstra (1994). Based on our utility
function (2.1), we can derive the import demand equation for a single variety using
expenditure shares s as defined above.26 Taking logs and first differences results
in:
∆ lnsg,c,t = ϕg,t− (σg−1)∆ ln pg,c,t+ εg,c,t , (2.16)
where σg is equal across countries, ϕg,t = (σg− 1) ln[φg, tM(dt)/φMg,t−1(dt−1)] is
a random effect, since dt is unobserved and εg,c,t = ∆ ln dg,c,t . The export supply
equation in logs and first differences is specified by
∆ ln pg,c,t = ψg,t+
ωg
1+ωg
∆ lnsg,c,t+δg,c,t . (2.17)
where ωg ≥ 0 is the good specific inverse supply elasticity27 (assumed to be con-
stant across countries) and δg,c,t is an error term. We assume that the the error
terms between the demand and supply curve (εg,c,t ,δg,c,t) are uncorrelated after
controlling for good- and time-specific effects. To take advantage of this assump-
tion, we first eliminate the random terms ϕg,t and ψg,t from equations (2.16) and
(2.17) by taking differences relative to a reference country k:
∆keg,c,t =−(σg−1)∆kln pg,c,t+ εkg,c,t (2.18)
∆k ln pg,c,t =
ωg
1+ωg
∆k lnsg,c,t+δ kg,c,t , (2.19)
where ∆kKg,c,t = ∆Kg,c,t − ∆Kg,k,t f or K = (ln p, lns), εrg,c,t = εg,c,t − εg,r,t and
δ rg,c,t = δg,c,t − δg,r,t . We can now use the assumption of the independent error
26Using shares helps to avoid the problems of measurement error of unit-value indices as pointed
out by Kemp (1962)
27If ωg = 0 we get the special case of a horizontal supply curve
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terms to multiply (2.18) and (2.19) and dividing by (1−ρg)(σg−1) to obtain(
∆k ln pg,c,t
)2
= θ1,g
(
∆k lnsg,c,t
)2
+θ2,g
(
∆k ln pg,c,t∆k lnsg,c,t
)
+ug,c,t or
Yg,c,t = θ1,gX1,g,c,t+θ2,gX2,g,c,t+ug,c,t , (2.20)
with obvious definitions of θ1,g and θ2,g. Since the error term ug,c,t is correlated
with the prices and expenditure shares in X1,g,c,t and X2,g,c,t , we do not get a con-
sistent estimator for θ1,g and θ2,g. Feenstra (1994) shows how to exploit the panel
structure of the data to get a consistent estimator by averaging (2.20) over all t.
Hence, we can use the GMM estimator developed by Hanson (2005) to run a
regression on the transformed equation of (2.20) to estimate θ1,g and θ2,g consis-
tently.
Y g,c,t = θ1,gX1,g,c,t+θ2,gX2,g,c,t+ug,c,t . (2.21)
where upper bars on variables denote sample means over t. This will produce
consistent and efficient estimates of θ1,g and θ2,g as long as for some countries
i 6= k and j 6= k (
σ2ε,c+σ2ε,r
σ2ε, j+σ2ε,r
)
6=
(
σ2δ ,c+σ
2
δ ,r
σ2δ , j+σ
2
δ ,r
)
(2.22)
Once, we have consistent estimators of θ1,g and θ2,g we can calculate the elasticity
of substitution σg:
As long as θ1,g > 0, σg can be estimated as
a) if θ̂2,g > 0 then ρ̂g = 12 +
(
1
4 − 14(θ̂22,g/θ̂1,g)
)1/2
,
b) if θ̂2,g < 0 then ρ̂g = 12 −
(
1
4 − 14(θ̂22,g/θ̂1,g)
)1/2
,
and in either case,
σ̂g = 1+
(
2ρ̂g−1
1− p̂g
)
1
θ̂g2
. (2.23)
39
The Gains from Variety in the European Union
A.2 Data Description
Table 2.7: Summary Statistics: Product Codes of the Combined Nomenclature
Year Total number New Deleted Total Net
of product codes product codes product codes change change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1999 10,428 144 303 447 -159
2000 10,314 109 223 332 -114
2001 10,274 50 90 140 -40
2002 10,400 780 654 1,434 126
2003 10,404 19 15 34 4
2004 10,174 273 503 776 -230
2005 10,096 97 175 272 -78
2006 9,842 486 740 1,226 -254
2007 9,720 917 1,039 1,956 -122
2008 9,699 75 96 171 -21
Notes: The large turnovers in the years 2002, 2006 and 2007 are due to reclassifications that appear
regularly. The empirical approach presented above is robust towards such reclassifications of products,
as for example noted in Broda and Weinstein (2006).
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3.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis was accompanied by a strong decrease in world trade
flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the WTO (2010) world
trade flows collapsed by more than 12% in the year 2009 and at the same time
FDI flows dropped by more than 37% (UNCTAD (2010)). As a consequence
of the financial crisis credit markets tightened and firms faced difficulties in ob-
taining external finance. Additionally, recent estimates show that around 90%
of total world trade is associated with some form of trade finance (e.g. Auboin
(2009)), and that firms use a substantial amount of external capital to finance FDI
(e.g. Marin and Schnitzer (2006)). Therefore, a growing literature on finance and
multinational corporations has emphasized that multinational firm activity, in the
form of exporting or FDI, is closely linked to the availability of external finance
to a firm.
The main focus of this literature has been on the effect of financial frictions in
explaining the export status and export volume of firms, sectors and countries (e.g.
Greenaway and Kneller (2007), Manova (2009)). A few, more recent studies also
emphasize the growing importance of the interaction between financial conditions
and FDI, but remains silent on how financial frictions affect the decision of a
firm to engage in FDI (e.g. Chor et al. (2007), Manova et al. (2011), Antràs
et al. (2009)). This literature on finance and multinational corporations so far
analyzes the two forms of multinational activity separately, but does not focus on
how financial frictions affect the internationalization strategy of a firm jointly.
Another strand in the literature examines the determinants of the trade-off of a
firm whether to serve foreign markets via exporting or horizontal FDI. The focus
of this line of research has been the proximity-concentration trade-off in driving
the decisions of firms whether to engage in exporting or in horizontal FDI, but has
not taken into account other determinants, such as the financing environment of
firms.
In this contribution I close this gap by unifying the explanation for the deci-
sion of a firm whether to serve foreign markets via exporting or doing FDI with the
theory on finance. The specific question I address in this study is to what extent
do financial frictions affect the internationalization strategy of a firm? Do firms
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acting in less financial vulnerable industries have a higher probability to engage
in FDI or exporting? And how does this affect the overall composition of export
and FDI sales at the industry and country level?
To answer these questions, I integrate a simplified version of the financial
constraints theory of exporting from Manova (2009) into the Helpman et al. (2004)
framework. This analysis provides new insights into the trade-off whether a firms
serves foreign markets via export or FDI and explains how financial frictions affect
and shape the overall composition of export and FDI sales within a sector, but
also at the country level. The model generates new empirical predictions about
the activity of multinational firms which find support in the data.
To motivate the empirical analysis, I develop a multi-country, multi-sector
heterogenous firm model of international trade. In the theoretical framework firms
can decide to serve foreign markets via exporting or by setting up an affiliate in
the destination market. The decision of the market entry mode of a firm in this
setup depends on the relative costs associated with both strategies. Both activi-
ties require investments in sunk costs. While exporting requires lower fixed costs
compared to FDI, firms face higher variable costs, in the form of transport costs,
when they choose to export. In contrast to Helpman et al. (2004) firms have not
sufficient funds to finance their multinational activity via internal funds and have
to raise external capital. In combination with the existence of imperfect capital
markets, firms have to pay an interest rate premium to the investor. These addi-
tional financing costs vary for both activities. In comparison with export, they are
higher for FDI, given the higher amount of credit required and the higher risks as-
sociated with FDI. Furthermore, credit constraints affect firms in different sectors
unevenly. For technological reasons, firms in certain industries require more ex-
ternal finance and/or have to pay higher interest rates, resulting in higher financing
costs.
The model predicts that in financially vulnerable sectors more firms choose to
serve foreign markets via exporting rather than engaging in FDI, given the higher
costs to acquire external capital. Consequently, these sectors exhibit higher ratios
of relative export sales to FDI sales, which constitutes the new prediction of the
model. In addition, the choice of the market entry mode of a firm depends on
traditional variables as pointed out in the proximity-concentration literature, such
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as market size, transport costs, fixed costs and dispersion of firm productivity.
I develop an empirical strategy to test the predictions of the model, using a
panel dataset for Germany that covers 26 manufacturing industries and 38 coun-
tries for the period 2002 to 2007. I combine data on FDI activity from the Midi
(Microdatabase Direct Investment) database provided by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2010) with detailed balance sheet information for about 25,000 firms from
the AMADEUS databank published by Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing
(2005) to construct measures for the financial vulnerability of an industry. I stay
closely to the model and proxy financial constraints using the liquidity ratio as a
measure of the ability of a firm to finance investments internally. Since I do not
observe the interest rate firms have to pay to the investor, I follow the previous
literature and use asset tangibility with the share of tangible assets relative to total
assets as a measure to provide collateral for the investor and thereby having easier
access to external capital. As alternative measures for financial frictions, I use the
debt ratio and absolute value of cash-flows available to a firm. However, as in line
with previous research in this case my results tend to be more tentative. The re-
sults show that my measures of financial frictions help to predict the composition
of trade and investment in the manner of the model suggested. Industries which
are less financially dependent and/or have more collateral to offer, are character-
ized by a larger volume of FDI sales relative to exports. These findings are robust
to alternative specifications of the empirical model. I implement an instrumental
variable strategy to circumvent problems arising from potentially reverse causality
effects.
I find that the effects of financial frictions are of similar magnitude compared
to the traditional variables of the proximity-concentration trade-off, such as trade
costs and country size. My estimates suggest, that industries which are 10% less
dependent on external finance or have a 10% higher ratio of tangible assets on av-
erage have a 3% to 7% lower ratio of export and FDI sales. In addition I confirm
the results first established by Helpman et al. (2004) and show that the dispersion
of firm level productivity within an industry is also an important force in deter-
mining the ratio of export to FDI sales for Germany. Finally, I find strong support
in the data for the proximity-concentration trade-off.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on finance on trade. While pre-
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vious studies have emphasized the important role of financial institutions in de-
termining trade flows and have shown that financial development can be a source
of comparative advantage, these papers mostly focused on the aggregate levels
of trade flows. (e.g. Kletzner and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Beck (2003),
Matsuyama (2005), Hur et al. (2006), Do and Levchenko (2007)).1 Based on the
emerging models of heterogenous firms, more recent papers have taken a microe-
conomic perspective and have analyzed to what extent financial frictions affect
firm level participation in export markets and how these effects shape the inten-
sive and extensive margins of trade. One important contribution in this strand of
literature is a paper by Manova (2009). In her theoretical and empirical analysis
she shows how the dependence on external finance and ability of a firm to provide
collateral affects the exporting behavior of firms and how these effects determine
the overall export composition at the sectoral and country level.2 While Manova
(2009) uses highly disaggregated trade data for her analysis, subsequent empir-
ical studies have used firm level data to examine the effect of financial frictions
on the exporting behavior of firms, including Muûls (2008), Berman and Héri-
court (2008) and Andreev (2010). All these studies find a negative effect of finan-
cial frictions on the export market participation and export sales at the firm level.
Greenway et al. (2007) use a set of balancesheet data for English firms and show
in their empirical analysis how financial conditions affect the exporting behavior
of a firm and at the same time how exporting improves the financial health of an
enterprise. While their results on the impact of the financial health on exporting
are inconclusive, they find that exporting improves the overall financial situation
of a company. All these papers have solely focused on the export market partic-
ipation of firms but do not take into account alternative market entry forms, in
particular not foreign direct investment.
So far only a few paper have considered the interaction of financial frictions
and foreign direct investment. Most of these papers examine the ability of sub-
sidiaries of multinational corporations to use internal capital markets to circum-
1In a more general view this paper can also be linked to the literature on trade and institutions,
see for example Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007).
2See Chaney (2005) for an alternative way of modeling financial constraint in a heterogenous
firm model.
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vent financial constraints in the destination country. For instance, Manova et al.
(2011) and Hericourt and Poncet (2009) find that subsidiaries of multinational
firms in China are less financially constraint compared to domestic firms. In a
related study Desai et al. (2008) examine how affiliates can take advantage of in-
ternal capital markets to increase production and outperform domestic producers.
Antràs (2003) show that in equilibrium the production location and integration
decision of a firm are affected by credit constraints if the investments of the input
supplier are relationship specific.3 Chor et al. (2007) analyze how financial de-
velopment of the host country affects the location decision of subsidiaries. They
find that a higher level of financial development of the host country induces lower
sales of the affiliate since a higher share of production remains in the host country.
More closely related to my approach is a study by Buch et al. (2009), which ana-
lyzes the negative effects of financial constraints of German multinational firms at
the parent level on the intensive and extensive margin of affiliate sales. Although
these studies examine how financial frictions affect the production decision of
multinational firms, they mostly focus on the effect of internal capital markets on
foreign direct investment, but do not analyze the effect of financial constraints on
exports or other alternative market entry modes.4
Finally, the paper provides new insights into and evidence on the proximity-
concentration trade-off as first pointed out by Brainard (1993, 1997) and extended
to incorporate heterogenous firms by Helpman et al. (2004). In these types of
models, the decision of exporting or to serve foreign markets via an affiliate, de-
pends on the relative costs associated with both activities and the productivity of a
firm. A pecking order of firm productivity determines the market entry choice of
a firm, where it is only profitable for the most productive firm to engage in FDI,
while less productive firms choose to export or merely produce domestically. See
Greenaway and Kneller (2007) for an overview of this literature. So far none of
this literature has considered alternative explanations such as financial frictions,
3Also related to this strand of literature is a paper by Marin and Schnitzer (2006) which an-
alyzes the mode of financing FDI. See also Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) for evi-
dence that less credit-constrained Czech firms self-select into becoming suppliers of multinational
firms.
4In another paper by Buch et al. (2005) they analyze the composition and determinants of
German foreign direct investment using the same dataset I use in this paper.
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which affect the decision between exporting and FDI.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following sections. In section
3.2 I set up the theoretical model. The model generates predictions about the
composition of the sales of multinational firms. In section 3.3 I describe the data
I use and provide detailed descriptive statistics for all key variables. Based on the
theoretical I develop an empirical framework to test the predictions of the model
and provide results of different estimations strategies in section 3.4. Section 3.5
forms the conclusion.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In the following section I extend the multi-sector heterogenous firms model of in-
ternational trade from Helpman et al. (2004) by incorporating a simplified version
of the financial constraints theory as proposed by Manova (2009).
3.2.1 Demand
Consider a world with N countries and S sectors in each country. A continuum
of heterogenous firms produces differentiated goods in each country and sector.
Consider a two-level utility function where consumers exhibit a love of variety and
consume all available products in each sector. The utility function for each country
n is given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over sector specific CES consumption
indices Cns:
Un =∏
s
CΘsns , Cns =
[∫
ω∈Ωns
qns(ω)αdω
] 1
α
(3.1)
where qns(ω) represents the consumption of variety ω in sector s from country n,
and Ωns is the set of varieties available to consumers in country n in sector s. The
elasticity of substitution between two varieties is given by ε = 1/(1−α)> 1 and
0<α < 1. The parameterΘs indicates the share of each sector in total expenditure
and satisfies ∑sΘs= 1, 0<Θs< 1. As was originally shown by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), consumer behavior can be modeled by considering the set of varieties
consumed as an aggregate good Yn ≡Un associated with an ideal price index for
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sector s of country n
Pns =
[∫
ω∈Ωns
pns(ω)1−εdω
] 1
1−ε
(3.2)
where pns denotes the price of a variety in sector s for country n. Using these
aggregates consumers’ demand for variety ω in country n in sector s can be ex-
pressed as
qns(ω) =
pns(ω)−εΘsYn
P1−εns
(3.3)
This specification implies a constant elasticity of demand for each variety ε , and
the price is higher if ε is lower.
3.2.2 Production
In this model, firms first decide if they want to produce for the domestic market,
before they choose whether to serve the foreign market via exporting or horizontal
FDI.
There is a continuum of firms in every sector and each firm produces a dis-
tinct variety ω . Before producing for the domestic market, firms have to pay fixed
market entry costs, fe measured in labor units. Once firms have paid their market
entry costs they draw their firm specific productivity 1/a from a cumulative distri-
bution function G(a) with support [aL,aH ] where aH > aL > 0.5 When firms sell
in the domestic market they only bear production costs a.6
Next, firms decide if they want to serve the foreign market n. If a firm from
country n wants to export its product to a different country i it faces two additional
costs: a fixed export cost of serving the market in country i which equals f nix , and a
variable transport cost τni. For the latter, I adopt the widely used ‘melting iceberg’
specification and assume that τni > 1 units of a good have to be shipped from
country n to country i in order for one unit of this good to arrive. The former
5Since I am only interested in the trade-off between exporting and FDI, I consider a partial
equilibrium model. The main prediction of the model also hold in a general equilibrium model.
See Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2003) for a general equilibrium approach.
6For simplicity I assume that there are no fixed costs to serve the domestic market. Conse-
quently, all firms that enter an industry also produce for the domestic market.
48
Export versus FDI and the Role of Financial Frictions
one can be interpreted as the costs of forming a distribution and servicing network
in a foreign country. On the other hand, if a firm serves the foreign market via
foreign direct investment (FDI) it bears additional fixed costs f nidi . These fixed
FDI costs include the costs of a distribution and service network as well as the
additional costs of establishing a new plant or subsidiary in the foreign country.
The difference between f nidi and f
ni
x can then be interpreted as plant-level returns
to scale for one sector.7 For the entire analysis I assume
f nidi > τni f
ni
x . (3.4)
While FDI saves transport costs, it requires higher fixed costs compared with the
export strategy.8
Given the CES utility function there is monopolistic competition in final goods
in each sector. In combination with consumer demand (3.3) the effective consumer
price for a domestically produced good – by a domestic firm or a foreign affiliate
– is given by pns(ω) = aα , and for imported goods, τnipns, where
1
α is the standard
markup, being smaller if the elasticity of demand is higher. Using these conditions
the additional profits of a firm from exporting to country i can be expressed as
pinisx = (τnia)
1−εDis− f nix (3.5)
and the additional profits from FDI in country i are given by
pinisdi = a
1−εDis− f nidi (3.6)
where Dis = (1−α)
(
1
αPis
)1−ε
ΘsYi (see the Appendix B.2).9 Both profit func-
tions are increasing in productivity and more productive firms perform better in
7For example, if in an industry the difference between both fixed costs is high, then taking
advantage of scale effects in production in the plant located in the home market is more attractive
than paying the additional relative high FDI fixed costs, indicating high plant-level returns to scale
for this industry.
8Here I exclude the possibility of export platform FDI, and vertical FDI. For an extension to
include vertical FDI see Helpman et al. (2003).
9All firms that export or do FDI also produce for the domestic market. Since I am interested in
the trade off between FDI and Export, I skip the profit functions for domestic sales here.
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both activities and are plotted in Figure 3.1. Profits are represented on the vertical
axis and a1−ε on the horizontal axis. Since ε > 1, a1−ε is a monotonic transforma-
tion of labor productivity 1/a and can be used as a productivity index. Both profit
functions are increasing linearly in a1−ε . Given lower fixed costs and additional
transport costs in the case of exporting from country n to country i, the slope of
the profit function is smaller and the intercept is higher compared with the profit
function for FDI. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) can be used to solve for the critical
Figure 3.1: Profits and Productivity Cut-offs for Exporting and FDI with and with-
out Credit Constraints.
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cut-off levels (anisx )
1−ε and (anisdi )
1−ε depicted in Figure 3.1 by the following two
conditions.
(anisx )
1−ε = τε−1ni (Dis)
−1 f nix , (3.7)
(anisdi )
1−ε =
1
(1− τ1−εni )
(Dis)−1( f nidi − f nix ). (3.8)
Firms with a productivity lower than (anisx )
1−ε can not profitably serve the foreign
market and will only produce for the home market. Firms with productivity levels
between (anisx )
1−ε and (anisdi )
1−ε will export to market i, since the profits from
exporting are higher than the profits from serving market i via an affiliate. Finally,
the most productive firms, with productivity levels above (anisdi )
1−ε , will choose to
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serve the foreign market i via FDI.10
3.2.3 Credit Constraints
I adopt a reduced version of Manova (2009) to incorporate financial constraints
into the model to analyze the effects of financial constraints on multinational firm
activity.11
Consider the following setup. If firms aim to internationalize their business,
they need to raise external finance. At the beginning of each period they make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to a potential investor, a financial contract is signed and
the investment for exporting or FDI is made. The contract specifies the amount of
credit and repayment to the creditor at the end of the period.
Since, I am interested in the effect of credit constraints on the trade-off be-
tween export and FDI I assume for simplicity that firms only need external capital
to cover fixed export costs f nix and fixed FDI costs f
ni
di , while transport costs τni
and market entry costs f ne can be financed via internal cash-flows.
12 For exam-
ple firms’ previous profits may not be sufficient to cover all fixed export and FDI
costs.13 This is also in line with the observation in the data that firms use substan-
tial external finance to cover their investment costs, which is especially true for
German firms (see also Bayraktar et al. (2005)).14
Hence, firms need to raise outside capital for a fraction ds, 0 < ds < 1, of the
fixed export or fixed FDI costs if they want to serve market i and lower values
of ds indicate less reliance on external finance. In this model the dependence on
external finance is sector-specific as a result of an industry specific technological
component as pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Classens and Laeven
10In this model I abstract from the case that firms serve foreign markets via exporting and FDI
simultaneously.
11See also Braun (2003) and Buch et al. (2009) for a similar approach.
12Allowing for external finance for transport costs and fixed production costs in the home market
would not change the results qualitatively.
13Firms may not be able to transfer profits from one period to another due to the presence of a
principal–agent problem, where stockholders demand the redistribution of all earnings at the end
of each period to avoid dispensable investments by the management.
14This way of modeling financial constraint is also in line with the idea that a firm is uncertain
about its future earnings and faces up-front costs to expand their business.
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(2003) and Manova (2009) among others. Firms will have to raise ds f nix if they
want to export to country i and ds f nidi if they want to set up an affiliate in country i.
Since the fixed costs of setting up an affiliate, f nidi , are higher than the fixed costs
of exporting, f nix , by assumption (3.4), firms need to raise more external finance
in the case of FDI.
Due to the existence of financial frictions, for example information asymme-
tries, creditors will charge an interest rate rsx,di > 1, which is assumed to be strictly
higher for FDI than for exporting (rsdi > r
s
x).
15 16 More specifically, I assume that
the interest rate for FDI is a positive multiple of the interest rate for exporting
(rsdi = ηr
s
x) with η > 1. The assumption of a higher interest rate for FDI com-
pared to exporting is motivated by the idea of higher risks for the investor. In the
case of FDI, the assets for production of the new plant are located in a foreign
country generating higher uncertainties for the creditor about future revenues of
the project, due to country specific factors (local labor productivity, management
skills, language barriers etc.). Furthermore, in the case of a default of the firm,
it may also be more difficult for the creditor to enforce his claim, as part of the
production facilities are located in a different country. FDI also requires higher in-
vestments and a higher share of external finance exposing the firm to higher future
financial risks. Finally, distance and country specific effects also generate higher
monitoring costs for the creditor.
In addition, I assume that the interest rate firms have to pay to the creditor
varies across industries. Although this is a strong assumption, it is again based
on the idea, that, for technological reasons, some sectors find it is easier to ob-
tain external capital. For example, as pointed out by Beck (2003) and Manova
(2009), some industries have a higher share of tangible assets which can serve as
collateral, lowering the risk for the creditor and consequently firms’ costs to ac-
quire external capital. Given this setup two new profit functions for exporting and
FDI can be derived.17 In the case of exporting from country n to country i, firms
15Here, the model deviates from others (e.g. Manova (2009)) where credit constraints only
affect the ability to receive a credit but do not have a direct negative effect on the profit function
of a firm.
16For simplicity, I assume that the world market interest rate which is the outside option for the
creditor is normalized to 1.
17I choose this way of modeling financial constraints to stick closely to the observable data that
52
Export versus FDI and the Role of Financial Frictions
maximize
pinisx = (τnia)
1−εDis− (1−ds) f nix −dsrsx f nix (3.9)
and in the case of FDI in country i firms maximize profits by
pinisdi = a
1−εDis− (1−ds) f nidi −dsrsdi f nidi (3.10)
Given the results from above, we already know that without financial constraints
highly productive firms will serve the foreign market via an affiliate in the foreign
country, while firms with lower productivity serve the foreign market via exports.
From the system of equations (3.9) and (3.10) we can see that financial constraints
affect both the decision to export and the decision for FDI.18 This has two effects.
First, some firms which potentially would export without financial constraints are
now not profitable enough to cover the additional financing costs and choose to
produce for the domestic market only. Second, firms that potentially would serve
the foreign market via FDI, now can not raise enough external finance to cover the
high fixed costs of FDI and choose to serve the foreign market via the less finance
intensive alternative, exporting. Equations (3.9) and (3.10) can be used to solve
for the new productivity cut-off levels for exporting and FDI:
aex∗1−ε = (1−ds) f
ni
ex +dsr
s
x fex
(Disτ1−εni )
(3.11)
adi∗1−ε =
(1−ds)( f nidi − f niex)+ds(rsdi f nidi − rsx f niex)
Dis(1− τ1−εni )
(3.12)
Both new productivity cut-offs are strictly higher, than in the situation without
credit constraints and are depicted in Figure 3.1. Now, only firms from country
n with the new, higher productivity cut-offs (anisx∗ )
1−ε and (anisdi∗)
1−ε can profitably
export or make FDI in country i. These new cut-offs are lower for lower val-
I will use in the empirical section, but one can easily think of different models generating similar
results.
18The effect that more productive firms are less financial constraint has been explored by Beck
et al. (2005) and Forbes (2007).
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ues of ds and rsx,di, indicating that lower financial constraints, due to less external
financial needs and/or lower interest rates, reduce the negative effect on the pro-
ductivity cut-off. In the absence of financial frictions (ds = 0 and/or rsex,di = 1),
we get the familiar results as in (3.7) and (3.8).
3.2.4 Export versus FDI with Credit Constraints
In the next step I examine to what extend financial constraints affect the magnitude
of relative export versus FDI sales. Let snisx denote the export sales from country
n in country i in sector s and snisdi be the sales of affiliates from country n in sector
s in country i. Then, relative export to FDI sales in country i in sector s can be
expressed as
snisx
snisdi
= τ1−ε
[
V (ax)
V (adi)
−1
]
(3.13)
where
V (a) =
∫ a
0 γ1−εdG(γ) (3.14)
Recall from (3.6) that firm sales are determined by firm level productivity given by
a1−ε . Given this specification, function V(.) summarizes firm level heterogeneity
within one sector and directly determines the distribution of sales, profits, exports,
and FDI sales in a foreign country within one sector. Since V (.) is a direct map-
ping of firm level productivity to firm sales, the distribution of export versus FDI
sales within one sector in a foreign country i depends on the distribution of labor
coefficients exogenously given by G(a) and the elasticity of substitution ε . To
model firm level heterogeneity G(a) I use the Pareto distribution. This is conve-
nient for three reasons. First, it is obvious from (3.14) that if firm productivity 1/a
is Pareto distributed with shape parameter k, firm sales are also Pareto distributed
with shape parameter k−(ε−1).19 Second, this shape parameter provides a good
measure for firm sales dispersion and can be easily implemented in the empirical
19The cumulative distribution function of Pareto random variable x with shape parameter k and
scale parameter b is given by
F(x) = 1−
(
b
x
)k
, for x≥ b> 0,
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section, where lower values of k and higher values of ε indicate a higher dis-
persion of firm level sales.20 Third, and even more important, any truncation of
the Pareto distribution from above, again results in a Pareto distribution with the
same shape parameter k− (ε−1). Using the properties of the Pareto distribution
V (a1)/V (a2), can be reformulated as (a1/a2)k−(ε−1) for each a ∈ [aL,aH ] and
equation (3.13) can be reformulated as
snisex
snisdi
= τ1−εni
[(
anisex∗
anisdi∗
)k−(ε−1)
−1
]
(3.15)
Plugging (3.11) and (3.12) into (3.15), relative export to FDI sales can then be
written as
snisex
snisdi
= τ1−εni
((1−ds)( f nidi − f niex)+ds(rsdi f nidi − rsex f niex)
(1−ds)( f niex)+dsrsex fex
∗ 1
τε−1ni −1
)φ
−1
(3.16)
with φ = k−(ε−1)ε−1 > 1. Equation (3.16) relates the relative share of export and FDI
sales to the fixed costs of exporting and FDI, transport costs, firm level dispersion,
the dependence on external finance and the industry specific interest rate.21 The
following proposition characterizes the comparative static results for the relative
size of export and FDI sales within and across industries.
Proposition: Relative export to FDI sales to country i in sector s are higher for
lower fixed export costs, higher fixed FDI costs, higher returns to scale at the
plant-level, lower trade costs, and lower firm level dispersion. Furthermore, this
ratio is higher in sectors which have a lower share of internal funds and higher
external financing costs.
Since x has a finite variance if and only if k > 2, I assume that k > ε+1, which ensures that both
the distribution of productivity draws and the distribution of firm sales is finite. See also Helpman
et al. (2004) for a detailed explanation.
20Axtell (2001) points out that a Pareto distribution best fits U.S firm sales. In the empirical
section I show that this is true for German firms data, too.
21Note that f nidi > τni f
ni
x in combination with ds f
ni
x > ts f
n
e ensure that the term in the inner
brackets is always larger than 1.
55
Export versus FDI and the Role of Financial Frictions
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ f niex
< 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ f nidi
> 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂τni
< 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ ( f nidi − f niex)
> 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ (k− (ε−1)) > 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ds
> 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ rsx,di
> 0 (3.17)
Proof. See the Appendix B.2.
Intuitively, within industry s an increase in the FDI fixed costs f nidi , a decrease
in the fixed export costs f nix or transport costs τni results in higher relative export
sales to country i, as the profitability of exporting increases. Since f nidi incorporates
both country level fixed costs, represented by f nix , as well as the costs of forming a
subsidiary, an equal absolute increase in both f nidi and f
ni
x , indicating overall higher
country fixed costs, reduces relative export to FDI sales. On the other hand, when
plant-level returns to scale are high, given by a high difference between f nidi and
f nix , relative export to FDI sales increase due to the realization of scale effects in
production in the plant located in the home market. Comparative statics also show
that in industries with higher level of productivity dispersion – induced by a higher
elasticity of substitution or a higher dispersion of firm productivity – relative ex-
port sales are expected to be lower, since FDI sales increase disproportional more
than export sales for a given cut-off productivity level of (anisx∗ )
1−ε and (anisdi∗)
1−ε .
So far, these results have already been established in the literature (e.g., Help-
man et al. (2004)). The novelty of this paper is to incorporate financial constraints
into a model with heterogenous firms to analyze to what extend financial frictions
affect the composition of export and FDI sales. As pointed out above, credit
constraints affect firm profitability, inducing higher cut-off productivity levels
(anisx∗ )
1−ε and (anisdi∗)
1−ε . The model predicts higher relative FDI sales in sectors
which require less outside finance (ds lower) or have lower costs of acquiring ex-
ternal capital, since these sectors will find it easier to expand their business to
foreign markets. These predictions constitute the novel contribution of the model
and will be tested in the empirical section.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In the following section I describe the dataset used in the empirical analysis and
provide descriptive statistics for all key variables. The data required fall into three
categories: data on the composition of international commerce, measures of fi-
nancial constraints and data for the proximity–concentration trade-off including
indices capturing firm level dispersion within an industry. To empirically analyze
the effects of financial frictions on the composition of export and FDI sales in a
multi-country multi-sector model, I require detailed data for all variables of the
model varying along both dimensions.
I construct a panel dataset of German affiliate sales and German exports for 22
manufacturing sectors for the period 2002–2007. I follow Helpman et al. (2004)
and restrict my analysis to a sample with 39 countries (see Table 3.9 for the list of
countries). The advantage of this approach is that potential problems of censoring,
due to the many zeros of trade and FDI sales across countries and sectors, are
reduced and that the results are directly comparable with those of Helpman et al.
(2004). At the same time this comes at the cost of reducing the representativeness
of the sample. However, the sample covers 95% of all German FDI activity and
64% of all German exports.
3.3.1 Data on International Commerce
The Microdatabase Direct Investment (MIDI) provided by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2011) is one of the few datasets in the world which collects detailed data
on FDI activity and comprises all foreign direct investments above 3 million Euro
and/or if the voting share of the investment is> 10%.22 Besides information about
the country and sector in which the affiliate firm is active, the database contains
balancesheet information about the turnover of each affiliate, which I will use as
a proxy for FDI sales. In addition the database provides information about other
variables such as assets and employees of foreign affiliates. Export data are from
Eurostat (2010) with detailed information about trading volume and trading part-
22In my analysis I will focus only on direct dependent investments and skip indirect investments
via an affiliate in a foreign country. For a more detailed explanation and description of the MIDI
database see Lipponer (2008).
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ners across all sectors at a highly disaggregated level. I aggregate both variables
according to the two-digit NACE industry classification and calculate the ratio for
each country-industry pair.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the ratio of export sales vs. FDI sales
across countries, where the standard deviation is calculated across time.
Table 3.1: Export versus FDI Sales by Country
Country Ex/FDI std
.
Country Ex/FDI std.
ARG 0.508 0.384 ISR 1.619 0.385
AUS 2.368 0.174 ITA 4.268 1.162
AUT 2.968 0.293 JPN 1.230 0.486
BEL 3.951 1.291 KOR 1.295 0.267
BRA 0.564 0.086 MEX 1.424 0.225
CAN 0.938 0.224 MYS 1.281 0.099
CHE 5.697 0.832 NLD 7.429 2.082
CHL 0.464 0.135 NOR 2.904 0.685
CHN 2.050 0.418 NZL 0.846 0.212
CZE 2.548 0.232 POL 3.014 0.976
DNK 5.050 1.292 PRT 1.530 0.339
ESP 3.585 1.441 ROM 2.316 1.228
FIN 3.785 0.504 SGP 1.624 0.405
FRA 3.461 0.598 SWE 4.062 1.509
GBR 4.697 1.071 THA 0.909 0.799
GRC 2.036 0.361 TUR 1.873 0.235
HKG 5.201 1.108 TWN 3.418 1.601
HUN 1.678 0.188 UKR 1.767 1.490
IDN 0.885 0.474 USA 1.404 0.192
IND 1.536 0.554 ZAF 1.615 0.435
IRL 1.775 0.881
Average in the cross section (panel): 2.477 (2.606)
Standard deviation in the cross section (panel): 1.596 (2.048)
Notes: EX/FDI represents the ratio of export sales over FDI sales for a particular country. The
standard deviation is calculated across years for the period 2002 to 2007.
More remote, large countries, such as Brazil (0.564), on average have lower
ratios of export to FDI sales, while closer trading partners, especially within the
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European Union, such as the Netherlands (7.429) have relatively more exports
sales than FDI sales, supporting the theory of the proximity-concentration trade-
off. The overall average in the cross-section (panel) is 2.477 (2.606), indicating
that on average export sales in a destination market is more than twice the size
of foreign affiliate sales. From Table 3.1 one can also see that there is substantial
variation, as well across countries as across time.
Table 3.2 summarizes the ratio of export to FDI sales across industries.
Table 3.2: Export versus FDI Sales by Industry
NACE Industry description Ex/FDI std.
15 Food products and beverages 3.793 5.099
17 Textiles 3.359 2.810
18 Wearing apparel; dressing 3.102 4.021
19 Leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, and footwear 1.448 0.949
20 Wood and of products of wood and cork 2.197 1.772
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 3.668 3.069
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 1.347 1.963
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0.413 0.383
24 Chemicals and chemical products 1.734 1.871
25 Rubber and plastic products 1.924 1.612
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.729 0.598
27 Basic metals 5.621 7.071
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1.890 1.759
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5.091 9.167
30 Office machinery and computers 2.590 0.513
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1.813 2.603
32 Radio, television and communication equipment 4.310 6.220
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 3.641 4.699
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3.515 6.146
35 Other transport equipment 3.128 3.839
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 5.227 5.926
Average in the cross section (panel): 2.754 (2.848)
Standard deviation in the cross section (panel): 1.549 (1.670)
Notes: EX/FDI represents the ratio of export sales over FDI sales within an industry. The standard deviation is calcu-
lated across years for the period 2002 to 2007.
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Again, one can observe substantial variation, across industries and time. While
some sectors like “29: Machinery and Equipment” (5.09) have higher export to
FDI ratios, we observe lower ratios in other sectors e.g. “19: Leather; manufac-
ture of luggage, handbags, and footwear” (1.44), reflecting differences in industry
characteristics such as fixed costs of FDI and/or exporting or scale effects in pro-
duction. For example, setting up a plant in the “19: Leather; manufacture of lug-
gage, handbags, and footwear” industry can be associated with lower fixed costs
and/or generate higher scale effects compared to the “29: Machinery and Equip-
ment” sector. On average exports of an industry exceed FDI sales by a factor of
2.754.
3.3.2 Measures of Financial Constraints
The contribution of this paper is to analyze to what extent financial factors de-
termine the relative size of exports and FDI sales within an industry. Therefore,
I need adequate measures for financial constraints for the empirical analysis. In
this section I provide a detailed description and discussion of all variables used in
the succeeding analysis.
I use a set of balancesheet and profit and loss data at the firm level from
the AMADEUS database published by Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing
(2005) and calculate several different financial ratios to measure financial con-
straints at the firm level. I have an unbalanced dataset on turnover, assets, liabili-
ties, cash-flow, and their main line business by industry for approximately 25,000
German firms in the entire sample (See Table 3.10 in the Appendix B.1 for a de-
tailed description of the dataset).23 As is common in the literature, I then calculate
the median across firms for each measure of financial constraint within an industry
as a proxy for the financial vulnerability of an industry.24 Although, this comes at
23I will use turnover as a proxy for sales although this can be problematically since turnover
can also include revenues which are not directly related to production e.g. sales of an affiliate. I
do this for two reasons. First, many companies in the sample only report turnover but not sales.
Second, this is consistent with the FDI data, since I also only observe turnover and not sales for
foreign affiliates. Calculations also showed a very high correlation of 0.98 between firm sales and
turnover if both variables are observed.
24The main reason of using medians instead of mean values is to rule out potential outlier
problems.
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the disadvantage of losing a lot of information at the firm level, this is in line with
the setup of the theoretical model and is based on the assumption that financial
vulnerability captures a large technological component which is innate to a sec-
tor and therefore will also be partly reflected in the structure of the balancesheets
as pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Classens and Laeven (2003), and
Kroszner et al. (2007), among others. This approach also helps to mitigate poten-
tial problems arising from endogeneity issues that firm’s financial vulnerability
responds to changes in the export and/or FDI status, since this is less likely for an
entire industry.25 In addition, this way of modeling financial constraints also al-
lows of implementing an instrumental variable approach in the empirical analysis
to circumvent potential endogeneity problems.
First, I follow Greenway et al. (2007) and calculate the liquidity ratio of a firm
defined as the firm’s current assets less current liabilities over total assets. This
measure proxies for the availability of internal funds for a firm, which corresponds
to my parameter ds in the theoretical model. Higher liquidity ratios indicate a bet-
ter financial condition of the firm, due to the increased availability of short term
internal funds, implying less reliance on external finance. Hence, a higher liquid-
ity ratio is expected to be associated with a lower ratio of export and FDI sales.26.
The median liquidity ratio for all sectors is 0.397 as can be seen from column
one in Table 3.3, ranging from 0.276 in the “15: Food products and beverages”
industry to 0.539 in the “19: Leather, luggage, handbags, and footwear industry”,
indicating that some sectors have on average more liquid funds available than
other sectors and may be less dependent on external finance.
Second, I follow Manova (2009) and calculate the asset tangibility of a firm as
the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. According to this line of literature firms
with more tangible assets find it easier to pledge collateral, mitigating the risk for
the investor and consequently reducing the costs for external capital, captured in
the model by the interest rate isdi,x.
27 Therefore, firms and sectors with a higher ra-
25For example, exporting and FDI may result in higher profits improving financial condition of
a firm resulting in a reverse causality effect.
26Table3.11 in the Appendix B.1 shows how firms differ in their availability of internal funds
27See also Braun (2003) for a similar approach and a detailed discussion.
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tio of tangible assets are expected to have a lower ratio of export over FDI sales.28
Table 3.3 shows the median and standard deviation over time for asset tangibil-
ity at the industry level. While some sectors use a relative high share of tangible
assets in production, such as the “21: Pulp, paper and paper products” industry
with a median value of 0.368, in other sectors e.g., the “18: Wearing apperal and
dressing” with 0.077, the ratio of tangible assets over total assets is relative low,
indicating less reliance on fixed assets in production as depicted column one. The
overall industry average is 0.210 with a standard deviation of 0.079. Low values
for the standard deviation for all sectors indicate that the median ratio of tangible
assets over total assets appears to be stable over time, supporting the assumption
of industry-specific characteristics.29
In the robustness tests, I use two alternative measures for financial frictions,
the debt ratio and the absolute value of cash-flows. Although both measures may
be less reliable for measuring financial frictions than the previous one, both have
been used widely in the corporate finance literature (e.g., Whited (1992),Fazzari
and Petersen (1993), Cleary et al. (2007)) but also more recently in the interna-
tional trade and finance literature (e.g. Buch et al. (2009)).
The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt over total assets. Similar to
asset tangibility, one can interpret the debt ratio as a measure of a firm to provide
collateral, or more generally, the firms ability to obtain a credit. Firms which are
highly leveraged ex ante have fewer assets available that can serve as collateral
and at the same time are exposed to a higher financial risk and therefore will find
it more difficult and/or more costly to obtain a credit. Consequently a higher debt
ratio is expected to result in a higher ratio of export to FDI sales. Nevertheless,
using the debt ratio as a proxy for financial frictions can be problematical. For
example, a higher debt ratio can also result precisely from a firm or an entire
sector having easier access to external finance and consequently using a higher
level of external finance with lower values, signaling better financial health. For
the debt ratio, the average median value of all sectors is 0.533 as can be seen from
28Table3.11 in the Appendix B.1 summarizes how firms differ in their endowment with tangible
assets
29These results are also in line what other papers have found e.g. Braun (2003) or Manova
(2009).
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column five in Table 3.3, indicating that all manufacturing sectors use a substantial
share of external capital for financing their business. This ratio can be as high as
0.704 in the case of the “20: Wood and of products of wood and cork” industry,
indicating a high level of leverage in this industry, while other sectors such as the
“29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c.” industry operate at lower debt ratio levels
of 0.464.
Finally, I use the absolute value of cash-flows as a measure for the internal
funds available for financing a particular project, reducing the necessity for exter-
nal capital, and predicting that higher cash-flows result in a higher share of FDI
sales. However, cash-flows can be an imprecise measure for financial frictions,
since they partly reflect business cycle effects and show a relative high variation
across firms and over time. Therefore, cash flows may capture less of an indus-
try specific component compared with the previous measures.30 One can see that
cash flows vary substantially across sectors. While the median firm in some sec-
tors generate high cash-flows, as for the example the “24: Chemicals and chemical
products” industry with a median cash flow of around 3 million Euro per year, the
average across industry is only 0.842 million Euro. Cash flows also tend to vary
substantial over time. For example the median firm in the “35: Other transport
equipment” industry generates a cash flow of 0.767 million Euro per year, while
the standard deviation over time is 0.468 million Euro. Finally, from the bottom
of Table 3.3 one can see that some of the variables are highly correlated with
each other. This is not surprising since some of this variables are constructed in a
similar way.
3.3.3 Measure of Firm Dispersion and Proximity Concentra-
tion Variables
Another prediction of the model is that within an industry, the ratio of export to
FDI sales will be lower if firm level dispersion is higher. This fact was first shown
theoretically and empirically by Helpman et al. (2004) for the United States. I
30Following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticism, there has been a debate on the usefulness
of investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure for financial constraints, dealing with problems
arising from endogeneity issues as well as taking into account access to external finance. See also
Brown et al. (2009) for a more recent overview of the discussion.
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contribute to this literature by replicating the results for Germany. In the model,
differences in firm size are reflected by differences in productivity, since more
productive firms have a larger market share and higher sales. I assume that firm
level productivity is determined by a stochastic process which follows a Pareto
distribution, where the shape parameter k of the distribution varies across indus-
tries and reflects firm dispersion within a sector.31 32 Using this setup one can
compute the firm level dispersion of an industry by regressing the logarithm of an
individual firm’s rank within the distribution on the logarithm the firm’s size.33
Figure 3.2 depicts the distribution of firm operating revenues (left) and plots (log)
firm level sales and (log) firm rank sales (right) for the “33: Medical, precision
and optical instruments” industry for the year 2005.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Firm Sales
Notes: Both graphs show the distribution of firm sales within the “ 33 Medical, precision and optical instruments industry
for the year 2005 ”. The left graph is a simple histogram of firm level sales and is truncated to firm sales lower than
150 million Euros for a better illustration of the distribution. The right graph plots the logarithm of an individual firms‘s
rank within the distribution and the logarithm of firm‘s sales. In the right graph of figure 3.2 the dispersion measure is
represented by the slope of the linear regression line, while its goodness of fit is represented by deviations from this line,
where a flatter line indicates higher firm dispersion.
31Note, that in the model the dispersion of firms also depends on the sector specific elasticity of
substitution among products ε .
32Using the Pareto distribution is in line what other papers have found. See for example Eaton
and Kortum (2002), Luttmer (2007) and Growiec et al. (2007).
33Under the assumption of a Pareto distribution the estimated parameter of the slope of this
regression line is identical to the proposed shape parameter of my model k− (ε − 1). See Axtell
(2001) and Helpman et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion.
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From the graph one can see that only very few firms have very high levels
of turnover and that the distribution of German firm sales fits very well to the
assumption of a Pareto distribution.34 Figure 3.3 summarizes the estimated coef-
ficients and standard errors for the shape parameter for all industries for the year
2005, with lower values indicating a higher firm level dispersion.35
While the “24: Chemicals and chemical products” industry shows high level
of firm sales dispersion this is less so in other industries, such as “22: Publishing,
printing and recorded media”. Small estimated standard errors for all industries
once more support the idea of using the Pareto distribution as a measure for firm
level sales dispersion.36
Figure 3.3: Regression Fit to the Pareto Distribution
Notes: The graph summarizes the estimated coefficients for the slope of the Pareto distribution
and its standard deviation.
In the theoretical model, the ratio of export to FDI sales is a function of the
34The picture looks very similar for all other industries and years.
35Alternatively, one can also calculate the standard deviation of log firm sales within one sector,
which is computationally equivalent to the previous measure under the assumption of a Pareto
distribution, although they sometimes differ slightly in practice. See Helpman et al. (2004) for a
detailed discussion. Nevertheless, calculations show a very high correlation of both parameters of
0.97.
36Again, the picture looks very similar for all other years.
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relative costs of both activities: the fixed costs of FDI, the fixed costs of export-
ing, and transport costs. Many of these costs are difficult to quantify and data
availability is very limited. Since the main focus of this paper is to analyze how
financing these costs affects the composition of international commerce, I use a
set of sector and country dummies in the empirical analysis to account for these
effects in most of the specifications. Nevertheless, the dataset also allows of con-
structing some proxies for these variables which are described in more detail the
following section.
Transport costs can be either for shipping or moving a good from one country
to another or due to other barriers created by destination-country specific effects.
I take the unweighted average tariffs obtained from the WITS TRAINS database
(World Bank (2009)) to proxy for these costs: this has been widely used in the
empirical trade literature. One advantage of tariffs is that they vary across indus-
tries and countries and hence allow for differences in transport costs across both
dimensions. But at the same time other studies have shown that tariffs can also be
a poor proxy for trade costs as they may only capture a relatively small part of the
overall transport costs. In addition, in my sample, tariffs contain many zeros or
low values and also do not exhibit a high variation across time, since many of the
largest German trading partners are within the European Union or have free trade
agreements with Germany.37
As pointed out above, it is very difficult to find adequate measures for fixed
costs of exporting and fixed costs of FDI. Both costs are unobserveable and vary
across countries and industries. Based on my assumption in the theoretical model
that all fixed costs of exporting are also common to the fixed costs of FDI, I control
for these common market entry costs in the empirical analysis by using a set of
industry and country dummies. While Helpman et al. (2004) only have a cross
section dataset, which does not allow them to control for country-sector specific
costs simultaneously, I can do this by exploiting the time dimension of my panel
dataset.
Since I assume that the fixed costs of exporting are part of the fixed costs of
37Another proxy for transport costs is the distance between two countries. However, since I
have a panel dataset and distance does not vary across time and industry, this effect is absorbed by
the country fixed effect.
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FDI, all additional fixed costs of FDI stem solely from the costs of maintaining
additional capacity in a foreign country. Therefore, I compute the value of tan-
gible assets per employee at the sectoral level, to proxy for additional plant level
fixed costs, which is a novelty in the literature. Although the costs for property,
plant and equipment per employee a firm has to acquire in order to set up a new
production facility is a plausible proxy for additional plant costs, one potential dis-
advantage of this measure is that it partly correlates with my measure of financial
constraints – asset tangibility – resulting in less precise estimates. Furthermore,
this measure may also not be independent of firm size or firm productivity which
potentially can bias my estimated coefficient. Again, including industry–country
pair dummies can also be used as an effective control variable for these additional
fixed plant costs.
3.4 Empirical Evidence: Financial Constraints and
the Composition of International Commerce
In the following sections, I first derive an empirical model, that is based on the pre-
dictions of the theoretical model described in the previous section. I then estimate
in the empirical analysis several variants of this model and test if the predictions
of the model are also present in the data.
3.4.1 Empirical Model
Based on the previous analysis, I can directly derive the empirical model, given
by the following specification.
log(Ex/FDI)i js = β0+β1FinConst+β2Disperst+β3FixPlantst+(3.18)
β4Tari f f ss jt+β5Xct+φs+ γ j+δt+ εs jt
(Ex/FDI) jst is the ratio of export to FDI sales in partner country j in sector s in
year t. FinConstrst represents one of my four measures for financial constraints
of an industry as described in the previous section and Disperst measures firm
level dispersion within an industry. FixPlantst is the proxy for fixed plant costs
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in a given sector, Tari f f ss jt reflect country-industry specific trade costs and Xct
is a set of time-varying partner country control variables. Industry fixed effects
φs control for systematic differences across sectors that determine the composi-
tion of international commerce within an industry. For example if Germany has a
comparative advantage in a given industry such as electrical machinery, this may
affect the ratio of export to FDI sales, regardless of whether firms in this sector
are more or less financially constrained.38 The industry dummies thus explicitly
account for factor endowments and Ricardian determinants of comparative ad-
vantage. Country fixed effects γ j control for partner specific effects including the
fixed costs of exporting and other country characteristics such as financial devel-
opment or the institutional quality of a country. Finally, δt represents year fixed
effects and captures all effects that countries and industries face in common. The
error term εs jt reflects any omitted factor that affects patterns of the ratio of export
to FDI sales.
As pointed out previously, one novelty of this paper is its use of a panel dataset to
analyze the composition of international commerce. This has the advantage that it
allows of controlling for industry specific effects, eliminating concerns about an
omitted variable bias problem, which has been a shortcoming of previous studies.
Nevertheless, the dataset also has some limitations which directly affect the em-
pirical strategy employed in the analysis. As pointed out above, Germany is one
of the few countries which report detailed FDI sales. Consequently, I am not able
to explore cross country variations in financial development to analyze the im-
pact of financial constraints on the composition of exports and FDI sales as other
papers have done in the empirical trade and finance literature (e.g., Beck (2003)
and Manchin and Pinna (2009)). Based on the setup of the model, I aggregate
export and FDI sales to the two digit NACE industry level, rather than using firm
level data (e.g., Buch et al. (2009)). Although this way of modeling allows of
circumventing potential endogeneity problems, it also limits the number of ob-
servations per year, potentially reducing the preciseness of some of the estimates.
Due to this limitations, the goal of my empirical analysis is to test whether the
central tendencies in the data are consistent with the comparative statics of (3.16)
38The same argument also applies for the measure of firm level dispersion.
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and evaluating the economic significance of the magnitudes associated with the
estimated coefficients.
3.4.2 Empirical Results
I start my analysis with a simple OLS regression of the logarithm of Export sales
over FDI sales on my two key measures for financial constraints, liquidity ratio
and asset tangibility, and my two alternative measures, cash-flow and debt ratio,
and use these estimates as a benchmark for the following analysis. In a further
step, I perform a detailed analysis of my two key variables of interest, liquidity
ratio and asset tangibility and test the robustness of my results to different specifi-
cations and inclusions of other potential explanatory variables. I test if the results
are sensitive to the use of cash-flows and the debt ratio as alternative proxies for fi-
nancial constraints. Finally, I employ an instrumental variable strategy to address
problems arising from potential endogeneity bias.
Table 3.4 presents the results for the benchmark model, where the logarithm
of export to FDI sales is regressed on each of my four measures of financial con-
straints and a set of industry and partner-country fixed effects.39 The estimated
coefficients on the various measures for financial frictions all have the expected
sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level with the exception of the debt
ratio, which has the wrong sign and is insignificant. First results also indicate
that the magnitude of the effects also have a sizeable economic effect. Given the
specification of the model, a 10% increase in the liquidity ratio (asset tangibil-
ity), indicating better financial health of a sector, results in a 7.4% (9.4%) percent
decrease of the ratio of export to FDI sales. These results can be seen as initial
evidence of the impact of financial constraints on the ratio of export to FDI sales
and serve as a starting point for the following analysis.
Since in the first regression I do not attempt to control for any other vari-
ables that might affect the trade-off between exporting and FDI this precludes any
structural interpretation of the coefficients, as they may reflect other effects that
39One may also want to include all four different measures of financial constraints into a sin-
gle regression model. But since some of them are constructed in a similar way, this may cause
problems due to collinearity issues as can also be seen from the bottom of Table 3.3.
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determine the ratio of exports and FDI sales.
Table 3.4: Export versus FDI Sales and Financial Constraints - Baseline Specifi-
cation
Dependent variable: log(Ex/FDI)i js
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquidity ratio –0.741
(–4.27)***
Asset tangibility –0.940
(–4.20)***
Cash flow –0.250
(–2.96)***
Debt ratio –0.098
(–0.17)
Industry, country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,163 2,163 2,163 2,163
R2 0.509 0.509 0.507 0.505
Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the (log) ratio of Export sales over FDI sales from country j to countryi in a
two-digit NACE sector s in year t, 2002 - 2007. Liquidity ratio, Asset tangibility, Cash flow and Debt ratio are defined in
the text. All regressions include a constant term, sector fixed effects and importer fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the
industry level. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 3.5 reports more detailed results for the liquidity ratio, which is my
primary measure for the availability of internal funds to a firm. In column (1) I
include the measure for firm level dispersion, fixed plant costs and tariffs. I also
include a set of partner-country fixed effects to control for market size and fixed
market entry costs in the destination country. Standard errors are clustered at the
industry level to allow for correlated idiosyncratic shocks at the industry level.4041
First, consider the results for the traditional proximity-concentration vari-
40Moulton (1990) shows in his influential work, how ignoring the correlation of the disturbances
in grouped panel data may lead to seriously downward biased estimates of the standard error. If
this is the case results can be misleading.
41Similar results are obtained under clustering at the country level instead.
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ables. The estimated coefficients for the proxy of fixed plant costs and tariffs have
the correct sign and are statistically significant. High transportation costs and low
fixed plant costs tend to attract more FDI as predicted by the model. Overall,
these results support the idea of the proximity-concentration trade-off first studied
by Brainard (1997). Next, consider the effects for firm dispersion. The estimated
coefficient is negative and significant in all four specifications, although their mag-
nitudes are somewhat smaller compared with the estimates obtained by Helpman
et al. (2004). German industries in which firm size is highly dispersed show lower
ratios of export sales relative to FDI sales, since a larger number of firms within
these industries find it more profitable to serve foreign markets via FDI. This re-
sult was first established by Helpman et al. (2004) for the U.S. and my results
confirm that this is also true for German industries.
To control for industry specific effects, I include a set of industry fixed effects
in column (2). While the coefficient for tariffs remains nearly unchanged, the
proxy for fixed plant costs is now reduced and no longer significant. Similarly, the
coefficient for firm dispersion also decreases and now is significant at the 5% level.
This is not surprising since the industry fixed effects capture part of the variation
in the data. More importantly, the point estimate and significance level for the
liquidity ratio are increasing in this specification, emphasizing the importance of
controlling for industry fixed effects.
I include a set of other potentially explanatory variables at the country level,
that may affect the decision of a firm whether to export or set up an affiliate in the
destination market, which are not captured by the partner-country fixed effects.
Results are reported in column (3). I include a measure for the development of the
financial system in a country to control for the effect that firms may take advan-
tage of a good financial system and raise external capital in the destination market
to finance their multinational activity. I also include a variable for the rule of law
to control for the overall quality of the institutional environment and political risk
in a country, since previous studies have shown that this affects the strategy of
multinational firms (e.g. Kesternich and Schnitzer (2010)). Finally, I add GDP
per capita to control for the overall development of the partner economy. While
my estimates for tariffs and fixed plant costs are nearly unchanged compared with
the results from the previous estimation, the coefficient for firm level dispersion
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is increased and significant at the 5% level. For the development of the country
and the quality of the financial system, I obtain positive and highly significant es-
timates, while the coefficient for the institutional environment is negative, but not
significant. These results are counterintuitive, since one would expect that a bet-
ter economic development and easier access to external capital in the destination
country will have a stronger effect on FDI than on exporting. However, it can be
easily the case that these variables also capture other, more general factors, not
controlled for in this specification. Finally, consider the estimated coefficient for
the liquidity ratio. In this specification the effect is slightly reduced and significant
at the 10% level only.
As another robustness check, I test whether my results depend on the country
selection in my sample. In the previous analysis I used the full set of countries.
This full sample also includes some less developed and transition economies, es-
pecially from Eastern Europe. In these economies at least part of the FDI is of a
vertical nature where firms explore factor endowment differences across countries
to optimize their production process.42 These effects are not embraced by my
model, which solely focuses on horizontal FDI and consequently can affect the
consistency of the empirical model.43 In addition, if part of the produced goods of
an affiliate are exported to various countries along the supply chain this may cause
correlations of the residuals across countries, even after controlling for country
fixed effects. Therefore, I follow Brainard (1997) and Helpman et al. (2004) and
rerun the regression for a smaller sample only including the largest countries to
mitigate these effects.44 As can be seen from column (4) the estimated coefficient
for tariffs has increased, while the the proxy for fixed plant costs is still insignifi-
cant. Additionally, the point estimate for firm dispersion is higher compared with
my estimates of the full sample in column (2) but now is not significant. This is
not surprising, given the reduced number of observations.45 These results support
the idea that especially for horizontal FDI the proximity-concentration trade-off
42See, for example, Helpman (1984) and Yeaple (2003).
43See Buch et al. (2005) for a survey of the composition of German FDI.
44See Appendix 3.9 for a list of the two country samples.
45Note, that the measures for firm level dispersion and financial frictions only vary along the
industry and time dimension but not at the partner country level as the measures for the proximity-
concentration variables do.
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and firm level dispersion are important determinants, but that this is less the case
for vertical FDI. The estimated coefficient for the liquidity ratio does not change
much, indicating that there is no differential effect of financial frictions between
vertical and horizontal FDI. This is not surprising, since one can easily think of a
similar effect of financial frictions for financing vertical FDI.
So far I have used partner-country and industry fixed effects, but have not ex-
ploited the full structure of the panel dataset. Therefore, I include a combination
of country-industry fixed effects and time fixed effects in the following specifica-
tion. For example, this enables the generalization of the assumption of common
fixed costs at the country level to the more flexible assumption of an industry-
country pair specific structure of the fixed costs of exporting. If both types of
dummy variables are included in the estimation, the system is solely identified by
the time variation of the data. While this on the one hand furthermore reduces
concerns about potential omitted variable bias problems, it also strongly reduces
the variation in the data to identify the effect of financial constraints on export
and FDI sales.46 Results are shown in column (5). Similar to previous results,
the estimated coefficient for the fixed plant costs is not significant. The estimated
coefficient for tariffs is now lower and significant at the 10% level. This can be
attributed to the effect of including both, country-industry and time dummies, as
they capture most of the variation of tariffs, which varies along these two dimen-
sions but exhibits a relatively low variation over time. At the same time, the point
estimate and significance of the firm level dispersion measure increases and is sig-
nificant at the 5% level, further underlining the importance of firm heterogeneity
for explaining the ratio of exports to FDI sales. For the liquidity ratio the fol-
lowing result is obtained. Both, the point estimate and significance level for the
liquidity ratio decrease and is now significant at the 10% level only. These results
indicate that my previous estimates were not misspecified and the availability of
internal funds is an important factor in explaining the ratio of export to FDI sales.
In the following analysis, I re-estimate the model but now using asset tangibil-
ity as my key measure for financial constraints. Results are presented in Table 3.6.
46This effect can also been seen in the strong increase of the R2 from 0.5 to 0.9, which can be
mainly attributed to the increased information explained by the fixed effects.
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I follow the previous analysis and in the first step include a set of partner-country
fixed effects and my other explanatory variables, tariffs, fixed plant costs and firm
dispersion. As can be seen from column (1), I obtain similar estimates in terms of
magnitude and significance for all additional explanatory variables compared with
my previous estimates in column (1) in Table 3.5. The estimated coefficient for
asset tangibility has the correct sign as predicted by the theoretical model and is
significant at the 5% level. I add industry fixed effects to the model in column (2).
In this specification, as well the point estimate as the significance level for asset
tangibility increases, once more highlighting the importance of including industry
fixed effects. The estimates for all other variables are nearly identical to the one
obtained in the previous analysis in Table 3.5. Next, I include a set of additional
explanatory variables at the country level in column (3). Most interestingly, the
estimated coefficient for asset tangibility is slightly reduced but still negative and
highly significant, while the results for all other parameters are in line with the
similar specification in Table 3.5 in column (3). Finally, I use the smaller set of
countries in column (4) and include a combination of country-industry and time
fixed effects in column (5). Again, my estimates for all other explanatory variables
are similar if compared with the corresponding results in Table 3.5. In column (4)
the point estimate for asset tangibility47 is higher and still significant at the 1%
level. However, in column (5) I obtain a negative, but borderline insignificant ef-
fect for asset tangibility, which can be explained by the inclusion of a combination
of country-industry and year fixed effects. These results further support the hy-
pothesis that the availability of tangible assets is an important source for acquiring
external finance and thereby has an effect on the composition of export and FDI
sales.
Besides the qualitative results of the estimates, another question focuses on
whether financial constraints have an economic sizeable effect on the composi-
tion of export to FDI sales. For example, according to my estimates for the full
specified model (column (3) in Table 3.5 and 3.6), a 10% increase of the liquid-
ity ratio (asset tangibility) implies a reduction of the ratio of export to FDI sales
by 5.23% (6.36%). For example, the model predicts that improving the liquidity
47The coefficient significant at the 13% level.
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ratio (asset tangibility) in the “33: Radio, television, communication equipment”
from 0.153 (0.429) to 0.180 (0.514) results in a decrease of the export to FDI ratio
from 4.310 to 3.879 (3.766). Furthermore it is interesting to compare the results
obtained for the financial friction variables with the estimates for the traditional
explanatory variables. Therefore I compute the standardized beta coefficients as
shown in Table 3.13 in the Appendix B.1.48 The calculations show that the effect
of financial frictions is of similar magnitude as for other variables, e.g., tariffs or
firm level dispersion. Hence, the results suggest that beside the traditional deter-
minants on the trade-off between exports and FDI, financial frictions also have a
sizeable economic effect.
To test whether my results are robust to different measures for financial fric-
tions, I use cash-flows and the debt ratio as alternative proxies for financial fric-
tions. Similar to asset tangibility and liquidity ratio, the debt ratio proxies for the
ability of a firm to obtain external credit and cash-flows measures the availabil-
ity of internal funds to a firm. Results are presented in Table 3.7. The first two
columns show results using the debt ratio and column (3) and (4) report estimates
for cash-flows. While I obtain a positive and at the 5% level significant estimate
for the debt ratio in the first specification (column(1)), the coefficient is still posi-
tive but not significant once industry fixed effects and additional control variables
at the partner-country level are included (column(2)). As a final robustness check,
I use cash-flows as an alternative measure for the availability of internal funds to
a firm. In the reduced specification without industry fixed effects and additional
partner-country control variables, the estimated effect is positive and highly sig-
nificant as predicted in the manner of the model as can be seen in column (3).
However, once the full set of controls is included, both the magnitude and the
significance of the coefficient is reduced (column (4)). Again, in all four specifi-
cations, the estimates for my measure of firm level dispersion and the proxies for
the proximity-concentration trade-off are similar in magnitude and significance if
compared with the previous results in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. Overall, these find-
ings further support the prediction that financial constraints affect the composition
48A beta coefficient is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient and the standard devi-
ation, divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. See, Wooldridge (2009) for a
detailed discussion.
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of export to FDI sales, although the results are more tentative if the debt ratio is
used as a proxy for financial constraints. Furthermore, both variables capture less
of an industry specific component as discussed in section 3.3 and hence results in
this case have to be interpreted with more caution.
Table 3.7: Export versus FDI Sales and Financial Constraints - Robustness
Dependent variable: log(Ex/FDI)i js
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Debt ratio 0.163** 0.184
(2.16) (1.30)
Cash flow –0.308 –0.159
(–4.53)*** (–1.67)*
Firm dispersion –1.751 –2.683 –3.193 –2.311
(–4.97)*** (–2.11)** (–6.45)*** (–1.78)*
Fixed plant 0.463 0.042 0.270 0.063
(7.69)*** (0.24) (3.54)*** (0.37)
Tariff rate –0.018 –0.017 –0.018 –0.016
(–4.11)*** (–2.75)*** (–4.25)*** (–2.79)***
GDP per capita 1.289 1.100
(2.59)*** (2.14)**
Rule of law –0.047 –0.031
(–0.57) (–0.38)
Financial dev. 1.015 1.020
(4.19)*** (4.21)***
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,163 1,742 2,163 1,742
R2 0.310 0.471 0.317 0.472
Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the (log) ratio of Export sales over FDI sales from country j to countryi in a
two-digit NACE sector s in year t, 2002 - 2007. Cash flow and Debt ratio and Firm dispersion are as defined in the text.
All other variables are defined in Table 3.12. Errors are clustered at the industry level. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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3.4.3 IV-Estimation
The final robustness check addresses the concern about a potential endogeneity
bias for the measures of financial frictions. While the model predicts a causal
effect of financial constraints on the composition of international commerce, one
might also argue that the status of exporting or engaging in FDI also affects the
financial condition of a firm or a sector respectively. For example a firm or sector
with a high share of FDI may generate higher revenues than a firm or sector with
high export shares, implying better financial conditions for the former one: this
generates concerns about a reverse causality effect in the empirical model.49 In
this case, OLS estimates are inconsistent. To address this problem, I implement an
instrumental variable strategy which allows for taking into account such effects.
Using an instrumental variable approach also has the advantage that it allows for
controlling for measurement errors simultaneously.
An appropriate instrument has to identify the variation in the observed ratio of
export to FDI sales at the sectoral level that is exogenous to the proposed measures
of financial frictions. Therefore it has to satisfy two conditions. First, it must be
correlated with the measure of financial constraint. Second, it must fulfill the
exclusion restriction, that is, it must not be correlated with the error term of the
equation of interest.
In the following estimations, I will use data on financial constraints of French
firms as an instrument for the measure of financial constraints, where the variables
for French firms are constructed in exactly the same way as for German firms. Us-
ing data of French firms is motivated by two facts: First, France is a country of
similar size and economic development and therefore the industry structure and
composition of firms within an industry is comparable. Second, data for French
firms are also available from the AMADEUS database provided by the Bureau
von Dijk (2005), ensuring comparability of the definitions of the variables of in-
terests.50 However, due to the substantial differences in data availability of cash
49See, Manova (2009) and Greenway et al. (2007) for a discussion in the case of exporting and
Buch et al. (2009) in the case of FDI.
50Helpman et al. (2004) have used the same strategy to identify the effect of firm heterogeneity
on the ratio of export to FDI sales.
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flows for German and French firms across years and sectors and the ambiguous
results for the debt ratio in the previous analysis, I apply the instrumental variable
strategy only to the variables liquidity ratio and asset tangibility.
While the first assumption on the relevance of the instruments can be tested,
we have to assume that the second assumption on the exclusion restriction holds
in the empirical model. Since France is the largest trading partner of Germany and
both economies are highly integrated. Consequently one may argue that if Ger-
man firms are less financially constraint they may have higher exports and/or FDI
sales in the French market, implying tougher competition in this market, resulting
in lower profits for French firms, thus affecting their financial structure.51 This
may violate the exclusion restriction. Nevertheless, given the setup of the model
and the assumption that financial constraints carry a large technological compo-
nent across countries, which is also in line what the prior literature has found, I
assume that this condition holds in all specifications.52
The results of the instrumented variable specifications are shown in Table 3.8.
Columns (1) to (4) show results for the first and second stage estimation for the
full sample, including all countries, and columns (5) to (8) show results for the
first and second stage estimation if the narrow sample is used. From columns (1)
and (3) one can see that in both estimations the coefficient for the instrumental
variable is highly significant and has the expected sign in the full sample case.
In addition I also use an F-test to check the relevance of the instruments in the
first stage regression. In both cases the value of the F-test exceeds 10, confirm-
ing the relevance of the instrumental variables in the first stage estimation and
reducing concerns of a potentially weak instrument. The high positive correlation
between the measures of financial frictions across countries also supports the idea
of a common technological component at the industry level. From columns (2)
and (4) one can see that in the second stage estimation for the full sample both
variables remain significant and have the predicted sign. In both estimates the sig-
nificance level of the measure for financial frictions is reduced, as is usual when
an instrumental variable strategy is applied. For the liquidity ratio the estimated
51This argument can also be made in the other direction.
52See Rajan and Zingales (1998), Classens and Laeven (2003) and Manova (2009) among oth-
ers.
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effect only slightly decreases from –0.714 to –0.624, while for asset tangibility
the estimated coefficient decreases more strongly from -0.888 to -0.216 compared
with the corresponding estimates in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6.53 For most of the
other variables the obtained results are in line with previous findings, although
some of them differ slightly in magnitude and also are sometimes less significant
(e.g. firm dispersion). I obtain similar results in terms of magnitudes when using
the smaller sample of countries. However, given the reduced number of observa-
tions, the significance for some variables is lower. For the liquidity ratio I obtain
nearly the same coefficient, but it is now marginally insignificant, while asset tan-
gibility also has nearly the same estimated effect, but now is also only significant
at the 10% level. Since my approach is limited to testing whether the central
tendencies of the predictions of the model hold, these results further support the
previous findings.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed theoretically and empirically how financial frictions affect
the composition of multinational firm sales. I developed a model of heterogenous
firms where firms can either choose to serve foreign markets via exporting or via
horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). In order to finance their multinational
activity, firms need to raise external capital to finance the fixed costs of exporting
and FDI. Due to the existence of information asymmetry and uncertainty about
future revenues, firms have to pay an interest rate to the investor, which is higher
in the case of FDI, given the higher credit required and associated risk of setting
up an affiliate in a foreign country. Due to distortions in the financial market, the
model predicts that the fraction of firms which choose to serve foreign markets
via FDI rather than exporting is higher in financially vulnerable sectors.
I constructed a panel dataset for the period from 2002 to 2007 using German
firm-level data for 26 manufacturing sectors and 38 partner countries. The empir-
53Determining the exact sign of the bias in this setup is not straightforward, since in equilibrium,
French firms exporting to Germany at the same time may affect financial health of Germany firms
and industries.
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ical analysis showed that sectors which are less financially constrained, measured
as a higher liquidity ratio and/or a higher share of tangible assets, have a lower
ratio of export to FDI sales, as predicted by the model. This finding is robust
to several extensions of the empirical analysis. My estimates suggest that finan-
cial barriers have an explanatory power similar to the traditional explanations of
multinational firm sales. However, when using the debt ratio and absolute value
of cash-flow as alternative measures to capture the effect of credit constraints, the
results tend to be more tentative.
One broader implication of my analysis is that financial frictions determines
the overall activity of multinational firms in a country and is an important deter-
minant of the composition of export and FDI sales at the sectoral but also at the
country level. Therefore, improving access to external finance for firms through
the development and design of adequate financial institutions has a broader impact
on the overall structure of a country acting in a integrated world economy.
This paper is one of the first studies analyzing the effect of financial frictions
on multinational firm activity, in form of exporting and FDI, jointly, and leaves
open several questions for future research. While the effect of financial frictions
on exporting has received substantial interest in the literature over the last years,
we still know relatively little about the effect of financial frictions on FDI, es-
pecially at the microeconomic level. Using datasets with detailed firm level in-
formation will further help to improve our understanding how firms choose their
multinational strategy when facing financial constraints.
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B Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Data and Descriptives
Table 3.9: List of Countries
AUT Austria* KOR Korea, Rep.*
ARG Argentina* MYS Malaysia
AUS Australia* MEX Mexico*
BEL Belgium* NLD Netherlands*
BRA Brazil* NZL New Zealand*
CAN Canada* NOR Norway*
CHL Chile* POL Poland
CHN China PRT Portugal
CZE Czech Republic ROM Romania
DNK Denmark* SGP Singapore*
FIN Finland ZAF South Africa*
FRA France* ESP Spain*
GRC Greece SWE Sweden*
HKG Hong Kong, China* CHE Switzerland*
HUN Hungary TWN Taiwan, China*
IDN Indonesia THA Thailand*
IRL Ireland* UKR Ukraine
ISR Israel GBR United Kingdom*
ITA Italy* USA United States*
JPN Japan*
Notes: *Indicates Narrow sample
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Table 3.11: Summary Statistics - Average Balance Sheet Data
Variable All Firms Asset tangibility Liquidity ratio
high low high low
Assets
Intangible fixed assets 1.84% 1.46% 2.23% 1.42% 2.31%
Tangible fixed assets 25.48% 42.32% 8.08% 18.02% 33.80%
Other fixed assets 5.16% 3.15% 7.24% 3.32% 7.24%
Current assets 67.21% 53.25% 82.50% 77.29% 56.78%
Cash and cash equivalent 9.13% 6.42% 11.94% 12.40% 5.44%
Liabilities
Shareholder funds 24.26% 24.03% 24.50% 30.86% 16.34%
Long Term debt 32.43% 36.80% 27.91% 40.61% 23.43%
Other non current liabilities 15.37% 12.92% 17.90% 18.39% 11.86%
Current liabilities 28.54% 73.14% 30.30% 10.54% 48.40%
Notes: This table presents average balance sheets using data from the AMADEUS databank published by
Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing (2005) and represents German firms for the year 2005. The different
lines are calculated as the percentage of the book value of total assets and total liabilities. The first column
shows results for all firms in the data, while column two (four) and three (five) depict the ratios for low and
high values of tangible assets (liquidity ratio). I calculate the average of all firms below and above the median
firm of all firms in the sample to differentiate between firms with low or high asset tangibility (liquidity ratio).
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Table 3.12: Data Description
Variable Definition and Source
Industry-level data
Liquidity ratio (Current assets - Current liabilities)/Total assets (Source: AMADEUS
database provided by Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing (2005))
Asset tangibility Tangible assets / Total assets (Source: AMADEUS databse, Bureau van
Dijck (2005))
Cash flow Cash flow from operations (Source: AMADEUS databse, Bureau van
Dijck (2005)))
Debt ratio Total debt / Total assets (Source: AMADEUS databse, Bureau van Di-
jck (2005))
Operating revenue Turnover + adjustments (Source: AMADEUS databse, Bureau van Di-
jck (2005))
Fixed plant costs Tangible assets / employee (Source: AMADEUS databse, Bureau van
Dijck (2005))
Tariffs Effectively applied import tariff rate in % (weighted industry average)
(Source: WITS TRAINS database, World Bank (2009))
Exports Aggregated exports of all German firms in sector s in host country c
(Source: COMTRADE database, Eurostat (2010)))
FDI sales Aggregated turnover of all German affiliates in sector s in host country
c (Source: MIDI databse, Deutsche Bundesbank (2011))
Country-level data
GDP per capita Source: Host country for GDP per capita (“cgdp”) in constant USD
from Penn World Tables 7.0. Source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
Financial development Financial development is measured as the natural log of private credit
by banks and other financial institutions to the private sector as a share
of GDP. Source: Beck et al. (2000)
Institutions Is an index that measures the extent to which agents have confidence
in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights and courts. The
index ranges from 0 to 10. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2007)
Notes:This is table reports the definition and source for all variables used in the empirical analysis.
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Table 3.13: Export versus FDI Sales Financial Constraints - Economic Signifi-
cance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Coeff. "Beta"
Ex FDI 0.37 1.18
Liquidity ratio –0.94 0.22 –0.71 –0.13
Asset tangibility –1.62 0.26 –0.88 –0.19
Cash flow 6.48 0.63 –0.30 –0.16
Debt ratio –0.59 0.12 0.16 0.02
Tariff rate 3.39 6.25 0.02 0.11
Fixed plant 3.20 0.53 0.37 0.17
Firm dispersion 0.57 0.08 –2.84 –0.19
Notes: "Beta" coefficient are calculated as the product of the estimated coefficient for
the independent variable and its standard deviation, divided by the standard deviation
of the dependent variable. Calculations are based on estimates in column (2) of Table
3.5 and 3.6 and column (1) and (3) of Table 3.7. In the case of fixed plant costs
calculations are based on column (1) in Table 3.5.
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B.2 Mathematical Appendix
Derivation of profits
In the case of exporting the firms maximization problem is given by:
max pinisx (a) = pis(a)qis(a)−qis(a)τnia− f nix (3.19)
s.t. qns(a) =
pns(a)−εΘsYn
P1−εns
(3.20)
Firms set prices to maximize profits. The first order conditions that follow from
3.19 and 3.20 are given by:
δpinisx (a)
δ pis(a)
= (1− ε) pis(a)
−εΘsYn
P1−εns
− (−ε) pis(a)
−ε−1ΘsYn
P1−εns
τnia= 0 (3.21)
Rearranging yields the optimal price:
pns(a) =
τnia
α
(3.22)
Plugging 3.22 into 3.19 results in the optimal quantity sold:
qns(a) =
(τnia
α
) ΘsYn
P1−εns
(3.23)
Finally, inserting 3.22 and 3.23 into 3.19 and rearranging gives us the maximal
profits in case of exporting:
pinisx = (τnia)
1−εDis− f nix (3.24)
In the case of FDI optimal profits in country i can be expressed as:
pinisdi = a
1−εDis− f nidi (3.25)
where, Dis = (1−α)
(
1
αPis
)1−ε
ΘsYi.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
From 3.16 it is straightforward to see that:
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ f niex
< 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ f nidi
> 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂τ
< 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ ( f nidi − f niex)
> 0
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ (k− (ε−1)) > 0
Next, consider the case of a change in the dependence on external finance ds:
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ds
=
f niex − f nidi + rsdi f nidi − rsx f niex
(τε−1ni −1)((1−ds) f niex +ds f niexrsx)
−
− ( f
ni
exr
s
x− f niex)((1−ds)( f nidi − f niex)+ds( f nidi rsdi− f niexrsx))
(τε−1ni −1)((1−ds) f niex +ds f niexrsx)2
=
f nidi (r
s
di− rsx)
f niex(τ
ε−1
ni −1)(1+ds(rsx−1))2
> 0
Finally, consider the derivative for a change in the sector specific interest rate rsdi,x
with rsdi = ηr
s
x and η > 1:
∂ (snisex /snisdi )
∂ rsdi,x
=
ds( f nidiη− f niex)
((1−ds) f niex +ds f niexrsx)(τε−1ni −1)
−
− ds f
ni
ex((1−ds)( f nidi − f niex)+ds( f nidi isxη− f niexrsx))
((1−ds) f niex +ds f niexrsx)2(τε−1ni −1)
= − (ds−1)ds f
ni
di (η−1)
f niex(1+ds(η−1))2(τε−1ni −1)
> 0
Q.E.D. 
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4.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental challenges in economics is to explain the large differ-
ences in economic development across countries. This study is motivated by two
well-established empirical observations. First, we know that institutions matter a
lot for the overall economic performance. Since the seminal paper by Kormendi
and Meguire (1985) and because of the availability of new datasets on institutional
quality, a vast literature provides empirically and theoretically analysis as to how
institutions affect the economic development of countries (e.g. Barro (1991), Hall
and Jones (1999), La Porta et. al (1997, 1998), Acemoglu et al. (2004)). Accord-
ing to these studies, a consensus has been reached that good institutions have a
positive effect on the level of income and growth rates of countries. Although,
there have been numerous studies trying to empirically analyze the link between
good institutions and economic performance at the macroeconomic level, we are
far away from thoroughly understanding the underlying channels how good insti-
tutions enhance economic development.
Second, there is widespread agreement that most of the differences in income
across countries can be explained by differences in productivity and technical in-
novations, which provide the foundation for the bulk of economic growth (Ace-
moglu (2009), Griliches (1998)). In addition, it is prominently argued that R&D
investments play a key role in the development of new technologies and innova-
tions and, therefore, largely contribute to the observed differences in productivity
growth across countries and industries. Again, despite the importance of R&D
investments as an explanation for differences across countries in technological
progress, there is little empirical evidence about the specific determinants of R&D
investments, and especially about its interaction with contracting institutions at the
country-industry level.
This empirical study fills this gap by examining the link between the quality
of contracting institutions and R&D investments at the country and industry level.
The specific question I address in this study is how firms’ R&D investments re-
spond to country-wide contracting institutions when firms act in industries that
rely heavily on a good contracting environment. More precisely, this study ana-
lyzes if contract intensive industries have higher R&D investments when countries
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have better contracting institutions.
To test this specific channel, I develop an empirical model that is based on the
well-established incomplete contracts literature (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990), Acemoglu et al. (2007)). The model is based on the idea that an
input supplier and a final goods producer agree to develop and design a new prod-
uct in close cooperation and, therefore, both parties have to invest in R&D. Owing
to the relationship-specificity of the investments and the existence of incomplete
contracts, there is a classical hold-up problem resulting in under-investment. This
hold-up problem is in particularly severe in industries producing complex goods
which require many different individually designed intermediate input goods and
thereby rely on a good contracting environment (contract-intensive industries). In
countries with good contracting institutions, the hold-up problem is mitigated and,
consequently, these countries have higher R&D investments. More precisely, if
the quality of the judicial system is a key determinant of the level of R&D spend-
ing, then companies operating in contract-intensive industries in countries with
good contracting environments will have higher R&D investments compared with
their counterparts in countries with weak institutional settings. Providing causal
estimates of this specific channel is at the heart of this study.
To empirically model this channel I use a a generalized difference-in-difference
(DiD) estimation strategy. This approach is based on the work by Nunn (2007)
who uses a similar strategy to analyze the effect of good contracting institutions
on the specialization pattern of an economy. In this type of empirical models sev-
eral indicators for the overall development of the judicial system of a country are
interacted with a measure of the dependence on a good contracting environment at
the industry level to explore the effect of good contracting institutions on the spe-
cialization patterns of production and exports in an economy. One key advantage
of this difference-in-difference (DiD) strategy is that it allows for the establish-
ment of causality under fairly weak assumptions. I apply this approach to analyze
the effect of contracting institutions on R&D investments at the country-industry
level.
I find strong support for the effect of contracting institutions on R&D in-
vestments in a panel of 29 OECD countries and 22 manufacturing industries for
the period from 1996 to 2006. At the country level, I find that good contracting
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institutions are positively correlated with an overall higher level of R&D invest-
ments. My results at the country-industry level show that countries with better
judicial systems have higher R&D expenditures, especially in those sectors where
relationship-specific investments are more important. These results are robust to
the inclusion of a wide range of control variables. For example I include other
potential determinants of R&D investments such as factor endowments, financial
development, country size (GDP) and country development (GDP per capita). I
also include a measure for the production in a country in a sector, in order to
isolate the impact of contractual frictions on R&D investments separate from its
effect on domestic output. As the primary measure for the quality of the con-
tracting environment, I use the “rule of law” index from Kaufmann et al. (2007)
and obtain consistent results for alternative measures of the overall quality of the
judicial system, such as the time or costs to collect an overdue debt. To measure
the contractual dependence of an industry I combine information from the United
States 2002 Input-Output (I-O) table with information about the product classi-
fication of Rauch (1999) to construct an index that measures the share of inputs
requiring relationship-specific investments. In robustness checks, I show that my
results are not sensitive to alternative definitions and data sources for this measure.
My results suggest that differences in the contracting environment are a ma-
jor determinant of R&D investments. According to my estimates, differences in
the judicial system of a country have a higher explanatory power for R&D in-
vestments than do differences in factor endowments. For example, improving the
quality of the judicial system by one standard deviation has twice the effect on
R&D investments compared with a one standard deviation increase in human cap-
ital endowment. Put differently, if Korea were to improve the quality of its judicial
system to the level of that of Sweden, then according to my estimates R&D in-
vestments in the highly contract-intensive industry “34: Motor vehicles, trailers
and semi-trailers” would increase from 1.95 billion USD to 2.67 billion USD.
This study contributes to several strands of the literature. The first strand
empirically analyzes the determinants of R&D investments. So far no empirical
study has systematically related the effects of contracting institutions to R&D in-
vestments. Hence, this study is most closely related to the literature on financing
R&D expenditures. This line of research shows that good financial conditions
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affect the levels and compositions of R&D investments at the firm and industry
level (Aghion et al. (2008), Aghion et al. (2010), Bond et al. (2010), Brown et al.
(2009)). All these studies mainly focus on a single industry, different stages of in-
vestment decisions or firm development, but have not exploited differences across
countries or industries. Here, this paper is most closely related to two empirical
studies by Carlin and Mayer (2003) and Maskus et al. (2011). Both papers exam-
ine how differences in the development of the financial system across countries
affect R&D investments in different industries. Both studies find that countries
with better financial systems have higher R&D intensities, especially in finan-
cially dependent industries.
The second strand of the literature empirically tests the predictions of the
incomplete contracts literature. Despite the strong impact of the theoretical liter-
ature over recent decades, a small but growing literature has empirically analyzed
the predictions of the incomplete contracts literature on the organizational forms
of firms and their investment decisions. Most of these studies focus on a single in-
dustry such as trucking (Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004)), defense (Crocker and
Reynolds (1993)), footwear (Woodruff (2002)) or housing market (Field (2005,
2007) and Gebhardt (2011)). A related literature studies the effect of property
rights on investment decisions in developing countries, such as Besley (1995) and
Jacoby and Mansuri (2008). They find that improving property rights in develop-
ing countries can help to increase investments. Again, both papers focus on a sin-
gle country and on the market for land and property. More closely related to R&D
investments and incomplete contracts are two recent studies by Lerner and Mal-
mendier (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2010). The former analyzes how incomplete
contracts affect the design of contracts for research agreements in the biotechnol-
ogy sector, whereas the latter studies the decision of whether to vertically integrate
the production process between a supplier and a producer depending on the tech-
nology used in the production process. I deviate from this literature in two ways.
First, I directly measure the effect of contracting institutions on R&D investments,
rather than analyze the decision of whether to vertically integrate or not. Second,
instead of focusing only on a single industry in a country, I exploit differences in
the contracting environment across countries and industries to measure the effect
of institutions on R&D investments.
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Finally, as pointed out previously, this study contributes to the literature on
contractual frictions and their effect on macroeconomic outcomes. A number of
studies analyze the effect of imperfect contracts on differences in economic per-
formance across countries, including Castro et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2001),
Acemoglu et al. (2004, 2010) and Glaeser et al. (2004). All these papers find,
that a better contracting environment is associated with a higher level of eco-
nomic activity and that institutions play an important role in the overall devel-
opment of a country. Related literature has focused on the effect of institutions
on specialization patterns in production across countries. Studies by Levchenko
(2007), Costinot (2009), Nunn (2007) and Azim and Fujiwara (2010) show, that
a better judicial system can lead to a comparative advantage in industries that
are contract-intensive, resulting in higher output and exports in these industries.
Here, the empirical study by Nunn (2007) is most closely related to my approach,
since he shows in his empirical contribution that countries with better contracting
institutions have higher exports, especially in sectors that are contract-intensive.
However, while Nunn (2007) focuses on exports he does not consider the effect
of contracting institutions on R&D investments.
This study fills an important gap in the literature as it is the first empirical
analysis that systematically examines how good contracting institutions promote
R&D investments and thereby can help to explain observed differences in eco-
nomic development across countries and industries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 4.2, I briefly describe
the underlying theory of my empirical model and provide descriptive statistics
that further motivate my approach. Section 4.3 explains the empirical model and
identification strategy employed in the subsequent analysis, whilst section 4.4 de-
scribes the dataset as well as the definition and construction of my key variables
of interests. In section 4.5, I present the results of my baseline specification as
well as the robustness checks of my empirical analysis. Section 4.6 forms the
conclusion.
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4.2 Theoretical Background
In the following section, I describe the underlying theory of the empirical model
and provide some initial first descriptive evidence on the effect of contractual
frictions on R&D investments. The channel I test in the empirical section builds on
the insight that if investments are relationship-specific, incomplete contracts will
lead to under-investments (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
Acemoglu et al. (2007)).1
To see exactly how contract enforcement can affect R&D investments con-
sider the following setup. A final goods producer plans to develop a new product,
and part of the new necessary inputs needed to produce the final good have to be
developed and produced by an input supplier. For simplicity, assume that the re-
lationship between both parties lasts for two periods only. In the first period, both
firms undertake R&D investments to develop a new product and in the second
period both parties bargain over the division of the surplus.
There are two important assumptions that affect the incentives and outcomes
of this cooperation: First, it is assumed that R&D investments are relationship-
specific and, therefore, that the value of R&D investments is higher within the
buyer-seller relationship than it is outside the relationship. This argument is par-
ticularly relevant for R&D investments, since the idea of cooperation in this frame-
work is to develop a new innovative good that is distinct from other products al-
ready in the market.2 Therefore, the newly developed input good produced by the
supplier has less value outside the relationship. Second, it is assumed that only a
fraction of the R&D activities undertaken by the input supplier in the development
of the new intermediate input is contractible, while the rest is non-contractible ex-
ante. For example it is impossible or too costly to write a contract for the full set
of possible future states.3 In my setup, the fraction of contractible activities is de-
termined by the overall quality of the contracting environment in a country. Once
1Earlier contributions to this literature include Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979).
2Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Lerner and Malmendier (2010) emphasized the role of good con-
tracting institutions in the development and adoption of new technologies.
3While Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) assumed that none of the activi-
ties are contractible, I follow Acemoglu et al. (2007) and assume that only parts of the investments
and production decisions are not contractible.
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the outcome and value of the investment is realized in period two, both parties ne-
gotiate on the surplus of the cooperation. That is, the division of the surplus of the
investment can only be determined ex post. Hence, the willingness of both parties
to invest into R&D depends on their expected outcome of the ex-post bargaining
game. Since none of the two parties is the full residual claimant of the surplus
from their investments ex-post, they tend to under-invest ex-ante. A higher de-
gree of contractual incompleteness thus leads to lower R&D investments by both
parties.4
In countries with a better judicial system, the share of non-contractible activ-
ities is lower and ex-post bargaining is mitigated. Consequently, countries with
good contracting institutions will have less under-investment in R&D, and this
effect will be even more pronounced in sectors where relationship-specific R&D
investments are more important for developing new final goods. Providing causal
estimates of this particular channel is at the heart of this paper.
To further motivate my empirical approach, the following section presents
descriptive statistics on the variation in R&D investments and depicts simple cor-
relations between R&D investments and indicators for contractual development at
the country level and contractual dependence at the industry level.
For simplicity, I focus on data for the year 2006 only. To highlight the differ-
ences across countries Figure 4.1 plots the level of (log) R&D investments against
the “rule of law” index of Kaufmann et al. (2007). The left picture shows that
countries with weak contract enforcement, such as Poland or Turkey, have sub-
stantially lower levels of R&D investments compared with countries with good
judicial systems such as Sweden or Denmark. To avoid that these results are sim-
ply driven by differences in country size the right panel also plots the share of
R&D investments relative to GDP against the quality of the judicial system in a
country. Again, countries with overall better judical systems have significantly
higher R&D investments.
4Another strand of the incomplete contracts literature has analyzed how the decision, whether
vertical integration or outsourcing, can help to mitigate the problems arising from the existence
of incomplete contracts. However this literature has also shown that this decision can only partly
reduce the negative effects on investment decisions due the existence of incomplete contracts.
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Figure 4.1: R&D Investments and Judicial Quality
Notes: This graph shows the relationship between (log) R&D investments in thousand USD and the judicial quality
in a country. The left graph plots the total of R&D investments in a country across all sectors against the rule of
law index (Coeff.=0.59**, R-squared 0.19). The right graph plots the share of R&D investments in a country
across all sectors relative to GDP (Coeff.=0.03*, R-squared 0.06). All data are for 2006.
While these figures show the differences of R&D investments across coun-
tries, they do not exploit the differences across industries. To emphasize the dif-
ferences across sectors, I compare R&D investments at the industry level for two
similar countries in terms of GDP, namely Austria and Czech Republic, in Fig-
ure 4.2. While Austria has a relatively good contracting environment, the judicial
system in the Czech Republic is of lower quality.
In the graph, sectors are ordered by their contractual dependence and plotted
against the volume of R&D investments in each industry.5 While Austria has an
overall higher level of R&D investments in nearly all industries, the differences
across sectors is even higher the more dependent an industry is on a good con-
tracting environment.
5Contractual dependence is measured as the share of intermediate inputs requiring relationship-
specific investments to produce a final good. For a detailed explanation of the construction of this
variable see section 4.4.
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Figure 4.2: R&D Investments: Austria versus Czech Republic
Notes: This graph plots (log) R&D investments in thousand USD against contract intensity at the
industry level for two countries. Austria ((log) GDP 19.37) has a much more developed judicial
system compared with the Czech Republic ((log) GDP 19.19) for 2006.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
From the previous discussion, it follows that countries with better contract en-
forcement have higher R&D investments, especially in those sectors that use in-
tensive inputs requiring relationship-specific investments. I estimate this predic-
tion using the following generalized DiD specification:6
(log)R&Dict = β1Qct+β2ziQct+β3hiHc+β4kiKc+ηc+ηi+ηt+Xct+εict (4.1)
where, (log)R&Dict denotes the natural logarithm of R&D investments in country
c in industry i in period t, Qct is a measure of the quality of contract enforcement
in country c in period t and zi represents the importance of relationship-specific
investments (e.g. contract intensity) in industry i. Hc and Kc denote country c’s
endowment with human and physical capital and hi and ki denote human capi-
6This estimation strategy was first proposed by Nunn (2007). It is based on the influential
work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), which has been used in numerous studies. More recent papers
include Manova (2009) and Pang and Wu (2009). In combination with R&D investment intensity
the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) has been used by Maskus et al. (2011).
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tal and physical capital intensity in industry i, respectively. Country fixed effects
ηc control for fixed differences across countries and industry fixed effects cap-
ture omitted sector-specific effects such as technology or factor intensity. The
year dummies capture all effects that countries and industries face in common,
such as communication costs, global business cycles and other general macroeco-
nomic conditions. I also include a set of country-time varying control variables
Xct including (log) GDP and (log) GDP per capita to control for different eco-
nomic developments at the country level over time. The error term εcit combines
any omitted factor that affects the patterns of R&D investments. According to my
hypothesis, I expect my coefficient of interest, β2 to be positive, namely that coun-
tries with better contract enforcement institutions have higher R&D investments
in industries that are more contract-intensive.7
This estimation strategy is conceptually distinct from simple regressions of
R&D investments on the measures of contract enforcement at the country level.
In this simple type of regression, changes in the institutional environment or pol-
icy reforms also affect the broader economic development of a country level and
thereby is correlated with other factors, which at the same time influence R&D
investments (e.g. Financial development). Therefore, such estimates cannot be
seen as conclusive evidence of the effect of contract enforcement on R&D invest-
ments. Because of the same argument, my estimates of β1 cannot be attributed to
the distinct effect of institutions on R&D investments and thereby its interpretation
remains unclear.
In the Difference-in-difference (DiD) specification, the identification of my
coefficient of interest β2 is not subject to such concerns. In this setup the identi-
fication of β2 is based on the cross-country time variation of my judicial quality
measure and variation across industries in contract intensity.8 A key advantage
of introducing the latter variation is that it helps establish causality, since contract
intensity of an industry captures a technological component which is innate to
7The same argument applies to my two other interaction terms hiHc and kiKc
8In this setup, the (continuous) treatment is given by the development of the judicial system
in a country. The treatment group includes those sectors located in a country with a good judicial
system, while the control group are sectors in a country with a weak contracting environment.
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an industry and, therefore, is exogenously determined.9. Hence, the variation in
contract intensity across sectors identifies the effect of contract enforcement on
R&D investments separately from other effects such as the general institutional
setting or general economic environment, since these are unlikely to be correlated
with contract intensity at the industry level. While this identification strategy as-
sumes that my measure for contract intensity is constant across countries, it does
not require identical contract intensity values in each country, although it is im-
portant that the ordering of industries remains stable across countries. Also note
that R&D investments vary over time and across industries and countries, while
contract intensity is constant across countries and time. Thus, time-varying R&D
expenditures at the country-industry level are not likely to be causal for contract
intensity. In addition, the index for contract intensity is based on United States
data. To rule out any feedback effect from United States R&D investments to
these industry characteristics, I exclude the United States in my empirical analy-
sis, which further shields against potential reverse causality effects.
There are several reasons which may bias my estimates of equation 4.1, which
I now address. First, there maybe a potential omitted variable bias problem,
namely, if other determinants of R&D investments are not included in equation
4.1 my results will be biased upwards. At first sight, it is difficult to think of other
determinants of R&D investments at the country-industry level. However, as can
bee seen at the bottom of Table 4.2 contract-intensive industries, also tend to be
skill-intensive. At the same time, countries with good contracting institutions also
tend to have high endowments of skilled labor, as shown in at the bottom of Table
4.1. Therefore, my coefficient of interest β2 may capture the effect, that highly
developed countries specialize in high-tech, skill-intensive industries with high
R&D investments. To account for this potential bias, I include several interaction
terms that vary at the country-industry level, such as Human capital endowment
and human capital intensity, to control for alternative determinants of R&D in-
vestments.
A second concern is that there a potential sources of reverse causality. How-
9This means in the DiD context, that the assignment of a sector to the treatment or control
group is exogenous and not related to the treatment itself
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ever, in the DiD specification this is only the case if R&D investments are causal
to my interaction term of interest ziQct . So far, there exists no theory that relates
R&D investments to the development of judicial quality of a country.10 However,
one may argue that countries with large R&D-intensive industries have a higher
need for the development of good contracting institutions and that these indus-
tries will lobby for an improvement in the contracting environment. To affect my
estimates of β2 the intensity of lobbying would need to be of the same system-
atical pattern related to contract intensity in all countries, which I assume to be
unlikely. Nevertheless, if this is the case, the magnitude of my estimates could be
influenced upward or downward, depending on the specific mechanics underlying
the lobbying interaction. Finally, using time-invariant measures of contractibility
in the robustness section further helps mitigating the potential effect of reverse
causality, since these variables do not respond to changes in R&D investments
over time.11
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In the empirical analysis, I evaluate the effect of contracting institutions on R&D
investments by regressing the (log) of R&D expenditures on the interaction of
country-level measures for the judicial quality with sector-level measures for con-
tract intensity.
Data for R&D Investments
R&D investments are in thousands of USD and stem from the STAN database
(OECD (2011)). According to the Frasatti Manual (2002), R&D expenditures are
defined in the following way: “Research and experimental development (R&D)
comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the
10Levchenko (2008) used a political economy model to show how trade integration can affect
the development of institutions.
11In previous literature, people have instrumented for the judicial quality of a country by us-
ing legal origin. However, legal origin has been shown to have a broader impact on the overall
development of an economy and therefore it is not obvious if the exclusion restriction holds. In un-
reported results I confirm my estimates using this IV approach. However, I obtain an even higher
effect for the judicial quality interaction term in these specifications.
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stock of knowledge, ... , and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new
applications”. In the STAN database, industrial R&D is defined as R&D expen-
ditures in a particular industry classified according to the two-digit ISIC Revision
3.1 classification, regardless of the origin of funding. Data are available for 1987
to 2007 for 40 countries and 28 industries. Owing to many missing values for
non-OECD countries, I focus on OECD countries only, restricting my sample to
29 countries. I further restrict the sample to the period from 1996 to 2006, since
data for my primary measure of the judicial quality in a country are only available
for this period. In the empirical analysis, I provide sensitivity analysis and show
that none of my results are affected by this selection. Furthermore, I focus on
manufacturing industries only for several reasons. First, my outlined theory fo-
cuses on inputs supplied by another manufacturer. Therefore, the overall setup is
less adequate for service industries. Second, data on R&D investments in service
industries are only available for a few sectors: in addition, these sectors appear
to have very different values for my contract intensity measure. This selection
reduces my sample to 22 industries.
Data on Judicial Quality
To analyze the impact of contracting institutions on R&D investments across
countries, I use the “rule of law index” developed by Kaufmann et al. (2007) to
measure the judicial quality of a country. This index comprises a number of dif-
ferent variables that measure the perceptions of the predictability, competence and
effectiveness of the judicial system within a country and that has been widely used
in the literature to measure the judicial quality of a country (e.g. Nunn (2007),
Levchenko (2007) or Berkowitz et al. (2006)). The index ranges from 0 to 10,
with 0 indicating a bad and 10 a good judicial system.12 Data are available for
1996 to 2006 for all countries in the sample.13 In the panel of 29 countries, judi-
cial quality varies significantly across countries, but less so over time. This is not
12The original index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5. For convenience I transform the index to range
from 0 to 10.
13Due to missing values for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001 I use a non-parametric linear inter-
polation to estimate these values. Given the high persistency of institutions this procedure does
not affect my results.
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surprising since institutions within a country are highly persistent and they tend to
change slowly over time.
Column 1 in Table 4.1 lists the countries and depicts the mean and standard
deviation over time for the judicial quality index for each country for the period
from 1996 to 2006. The cross-section (panel) average score for the judicial quality
of a country is 7.71 (7.71) with a standard deviation of 0.96 (0.98). In the median
country (France) the judicial quality index ranges from 7.54 to 8.04. In the cross-
section the country with the worst judicial system in my sample is Turkey with an
average score of 4.91 and the country with the highest score is Finland with an
average score of 8.78. In the overall panel, the index varies from 4.68 (Turkey,
1998) to 8.92 (Denmark, 2007).
In the empirical analysis, I also use four alternative measures for the judi-
cal quality of a country. I use the variables repudiation of contracts and risk of
expropriation obtained from La Porta et al. (1998) to proxy for the quality of
the judicial system. Finally, I use two variables from the World Bank’s Doing
Business Database, which compromises statistics on the efficiency and costs of
a judicial system. These two indices are available for a subset of countries only
and they do not vary over time. Summary statistics and correlations among all
measures in the cross-section are depicted in Table 4.8 in the Appendix C.2.
Measures of Contract Intensity
To identify the effect of legal institutions on R&D investments, I need a variable
that measures the importance of relationship-specific investments at the industry
level. I follow Nunn (2007) and construct an index at the industry level to measure
the dependence of a sector on a good contracting environment for each industry.
In a first step, I use the 2002 United States Input-Output (I-O) Use Table
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (2011), which provides informa-
tion about the values of the intermediate inputs used to produce a final good for
439 industries according to the BEA I-O industry classification.14 Since data on
R&D investments are only available at the two-digit ISIC Rev. 3.1 level of dis-
14The BEA I-O industry classification is comparable, although slightly more restrictive, than is
the six-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS).
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Table 4.1: Country Characteristics
Country Rule of Law Human Physical
Capital Capital
avg. (std.) Endowment Endowment
Australia 8.45 (0.04) 88,075 2.98
Austria 8.66 (0.08) 71,627 2.23
Belgium 7.62 (0.13) 76,452 2.77
Canada 8.36 (0.08) 82,442 3.01
Chile 7.51 (0.08) 22,451 2.19
Czech Republic 6.71 (0.14)
Denmark 8.68 (0.10) 70,514 3.00
Finland 8.78 (0.07) 89,195 2.83
France 7.80 (0.14) 84,928 2.2
Germany 8.23 (0.08) 89,368 2.66
Hungary 6.86 (0.12) 33,856 3.09
Iceland 8.55 (0.36) 66,642 2.53
Ireland 8.15 (0.15) 55,738 2.56
Israel 7.06 (0.39) 51,767 2.82
Italy 7.40 (0.17) 82,317 2.15
Japan 7.63 (0.13) 64,180 2.64
Korea 6.73 (0.13) 24,650 2.52
Netherlands 8.43 (0.05) 79,069 2.66
New Zealand 8.63 (0.12) 78,048 3.37
Norway 8.76 (0.12) 94,830 3.01
Poland 6.36 (0.35) 33,948 2.63
Portugal 7.41 (0.20) 29,436 1.67
Slovak Republic 5.84 (0.21)
Slovenia 7.12 (0.23)
Spain 7.49 (0.23) 61,637 2.00
Sweden 8.57 (0.07) 72,777 2.83
Switzerland 8.74 (0.12) 10,786 2.76
Turkey 4.92 (0.25) 16,290 1.55
United Kingdom 8.30 (0.11) 50,408 2.68
Country avg. cross section (panel) 7.71 (7.71) 64,588 2.59
Country std. cross section (panel) 0.98 (0.96) 24,954 0.43
Correlation
Rule of law (avg.) 1.00
(log) Physical capital endowment 0.81 1.00
(log) Human capital endowment 0.56 0.54 1.00
Notes: The table summarizes the variation in rule of law, physical capital and human capital used in
the empirical analysis. Column one reports the average rule of law for each country for the period 1993
to 2006 and column two the corresponding standard deviation across time. In the bottom of the table I
also report the cross country mean and standard deviation in the cross section as well as the correlation
between all measures.
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aggregation, I aggregate the final goods of the United States I-O Use Table to the
two-digit ISIC Rev. 3.1 level.15 I use this information to calculate the share of
each intermediate input used in the customization of a final good.
Second, I use the classification of Rauch (1999) to identify which intermediate
inputs that are used in production need relationship-specific investments. Rauch
(1999) classified 1,190 goods according to the four-digit SITC Rev. 2 system
into three different categories: sold on an organized exchange, reference priced
or neither. If a good is sold on an organized exchange or is referenced priced
this can be seen as an indicator of thick markets with many buyers and sellers
for more standardized input goods. These markets are much less susceptible to
the hold-up problem described in the previous section, since the input supplier
or final goods producer can easily sell/buy the intermediate good to/from another
participant in the market. Therefore, I define a good to be relationship-specific
if it is neither sold on an organized exchange nor reference priced.16 Next, I
construct a concordance table from the four-digit SITC Rev. 2 classification to the
BEA I-O classification. This allows me to calculate the share of each intermediate
input used in the production that is relationship-specific (neither reference priced
nor sold on an organized exchange). Finally, I combine this information with my
information from the U.S. I-O Use Table and calculate for each final good the
proportion of its intermediate inputs that are relationship-specific. For a more
detailed explanation of the construction of this index, see Nunn (2007).
Column (3) in Table 4.2 lists the contract intensity for each industry used in
the empirical analysis. According to this index, in the median contract-intensive
industry “36: Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c” about 49% of the inputs used in the
production of final goods are classified as being relationship-specific while 51%
of the inputs are traded on thick markets and are sold on an organized exchange
or are reference priced. The index varies significantly across industries with an
average contract intensity of 0.47 and a standard deviation of 0.22. The overall
picture of the contract intensity of an industry also appears sensible. Industries,
15I construct a concordance table from the BEA I-O industry classification to the 2-digt ISIC
Rev. 3.1 classification. For a detailed explanation see the Appendix C.1.
16Rauch (1999) provided a liberal and a conservative classification of products. Throughout the
paper, I use the liberal classification.
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such as “23: Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel” or “15: Food prod-
ucts and beverages”, with a high share of primary inputs, that are sold on thick
markets, are classified as less contract-intensive. By contrast, industries such as
“32: Radio, television and communication equipment” or “30: Office, accounting
and computing machinery” are classified as highly contract-intensive, requiring a
high proportion of customized intermediate inputs.
In the robustness analysis, I also construct a Herfindahl index, which mea-
sures the concentration of intermediate inputs used in production as an alternative
proxy for the contract intensity of an industry.17 Again, I select the share of each
input used in production for a final good from the 2002 United States I-O Use
Table to compute this index. The reason for using the Herfindahl index is the fol-
lowing: if a final goods producer sources inputs only from a few input suppliers
(high-input concentration), and all other intermediate inputs are only used rela-
tively little, then the risk of expropriation for this firm is relatively low. Hence,
this firm is less dependent on a good judicial environment, compared with a firm
that sources many inputs in equal weights from different sources (low-input con-
centration).18
Data on Factor Endowments and Factor Intensity
Data on factor endowments and factor intensity are from standard sources. I use
the (log) stock of physical capital per worker and (log) human capital per worker
as constructed by Caselli (2005). Human capital per worker is defined as the
average years of schooling in the population over 25 years old and physical capital
is the average capital stock per worker in a country. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.1
provide summary statistics for both measures for each country. Data on factor
intensity stem from Bartelsman and Gray (1996). Capital intensity is measured
as the ratio of total real capital stock and value added for industries in the United
States and human capital intensity is calculated as nonproduction worker wages
divided by the total wages for United States industries. Summary statistics for
each industry are depicted in columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.2. The Appendix C.1
17To measure the institutional dependence of a sector, this index was also used by Levchenko
(2007) and Blanchard and Kremer (1997)
18The correlation between both measures of contract intensity is 0.36.
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Table 4.2: Industry Characteristics
ISIC Industry R&D Contract Physical Human
code in mil. Intensity Capital Capital
USD Intensity Intensity
15 Food products and beverages 1,208 0.163 0.891 0.374
16 Tobacco products 63 0.196 0.185 0.402
17 Textiles 433 0.460 0.776 0.377
18 Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur 93 0.284 0.379 0.369
19 Leather, leather products and footwear 62 0.553 0.738 0.358
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 285 0.446 0.670 0.317
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 652 0.500 1.100 0.346
22 Printing and publishing 299 0.743 0.632 0.355
23 Coke, refined petroleum products 1,460 0.065 1.917 0.346
24 Chemicals and chemical products 31,134 0.257 0.824 0.539
25 Rubber and plastics products 3,491 0.294 0.917 0.314
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2,093 0.353 0.911 0.304
27 Basic metals 3,790 0.249 1.149 0.305
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery 2,281 0.431 0.704 0.377
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c 14,256 0.721 0.822 0.383
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 10,240 0.793 0.731 0.736
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 10,470 0.576 0.483 0.547
32 Radio, television, communication equipment 28,937 0.907 0.951 0.595
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 8,310 0.690 0.542 0.655
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 26,202 0.700 0.834 0.260
35 Other transport equipment 10,064 0.585 0.586 0.503
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 1,257 0.493 0.493 0.338
Industry average 7,140 0.471 0.783 0.413
Industry standard deviation 9,736 0.226 0.340 0.125
Correlation
Contract intensity 1.000
Physical capital intensity -0.276 1.000
Human capital intensity 0.462 -0.226 1.000
Notes: This table reports the measures of contract intensity, physical capital intensity and human capital intensity used in
the empirical analysis for all 22 manufacturing sectors used in the empirical analysis. In the bottom of the table I also report
the industry average and industry standard deviations across countries as well as the correlations between all measures.
110
Incomplete Contracts, Relationship-Specificity and R&D Investments
describes all other variables used in the empirical analysis.
4.5 Results
I now turn to the results of my estimations of equation 4.1. The sample consists
of 29 countries and 22 manufacturing industries for the period from 1993 to 2006
and, therefore, the maximum number of possible observations is 9,338. However,
because data on R&D investments are not available for all country-industry-year
pairs the panel is unbalanced and the number observations drops to 6,049. In
the section 4.5.1, I first report the estimates of my baseline specification, before
turning to the robustness and sensitivity analysis in section 4.5.2.
4.5.1 Main Results
Table 4.3 reports OLS estimates of equation 4.1. In the first column, I only include
my measure for judicial quality and my judicial quality interaction term. In this
specification, I also add a set of country, industry and year fixed effects as well
as GDP and GDP per capita. I cluster errors by industry-year pair, since the error
term in equation 4.1 reflects unobserved common shocks to industries in a certain
year.19 The coefficient of judicial quality is positive but not significant. This can
be attributed to the fact that my measure for judicial quality, rule of law and insti-
tutions in general change slowly over time and, therefore most of the direct effects
are captured by the country fixed effect. My main coefficient of interest β2 is pos-
itive and highly significant and supports the hypothesis that contract enforcement
is important for explaining R&D investments.
Next, I include two factor endowment interactions for human and physical
capital as alternative determinants of R&D investments. Since data on factor en-
dowments are only available for 26 countries,20 the number of observations drops
19Moulton (1990), showed in her influential work that ignoring the correlation of the distur-
bances, in grouped panel data may lead to seriously downward biased estimates of the standard
error. If this is the case results can be misleading.
20The countries for which factor endowments are not available are Slovenia, the Czech Republic
and the Slovak Republic.
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to 5,300.21 Both interaction terms are positive. While my measure for physical
capital is significant at the 5%-level, human capital turns out to be borderline not
significant in this specification.22 However, my estimates for the judicial quality
interaction are slightly reduced, but they remain positive and highly significant.
I control for other potential determinants of R&D investments at the country-
industry level in column (3), which if omitted may bias my estimated coefficient
for the judicial quality interaction term. I include a set of control variables at the
industry level, which I interact with (log) income per capita. The idea is to capture
other possible determinants, unrelated to contract enforcement, that high-income
countries may specialize in certain industries and which at the same time have
high R&D investments. Since, some of these measure are not available for all
industries and countries the number of observations further drops to 4,752. I con-
struct an interaction term with the share of value added relative to Output to con-
trol for the effect that high-income countries may specialize in high value added
industries, that at the same time have high R&D investments. To take into account
the effect that high-income economies concentrate on industries that display rapid
technological change, I interact log income per capita with average TFP growth. I
also include an interaction term of log income per capita with inter-industry trade
to capture the effect that high-income countries may specialize in sectors with
a high degree of fragmentation of the production process. Finally, I interact in-
come per capita with a Herfindahl index of input concentration.23. Including the
Herfindahl index accounts for the effect that my results may solely reflect the fact
that high-income countries produce more complex goods, but that this effect is
not related to contract enforcement. All interaction terms are positive and signifi-
cant.24 However, my estimates for the judicial quality interaction term are nearly
unaffected.
21I also rerun the estimation of column (1) with the smaller sample. However this did not alter
my results.
22I also experimented with alternative measures and data sources for human and physical capital
endowments. None of these estimates delivered different results. I chose these measures, since
they have the largest coverage for my dataset.
23I multiply the Herfindahl index by -1 to have an index that increases with input concentration
24I also performed regressions, where I included the interaction terms separately and also in
different combinations. None of these estimates revealed different results.
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In a recent study Maskus et al. (2011) show that financial development has a
positive effect on R&D investments. Therefore, I add an additional control vari-
able, to interact financial development with capital intensity at the industry level
in column (4). Contrary to their results, in my estimation the interaction term is
slightly negative and insignificant in most specifications. However, in contrast to
Maskus et al. (2011), I focus on absolute values of R&D investments and use a
different measure to capture the effect of financial development on R&D invest-
ments.25 At the same time, it is likely that this effect is already captured by one
of my other controls because, for example the interaction of log income and value
added is highly correlated with my interaction term for financial development. My
results for the judicial quality interaction term remain unchanged.
Finally, I include the full set of controls in column (5). In this case, the num-
ber of observations is further reduced to 4,326. All controls have the expected sign
and are significant, at least at the 5% level, with the exception of my interaction
term for capital endowment, which is now slightly negative and no more signif-
icant and financial development which is also slightly negative and significant at
the 10% level.26 More importantly, in this specification my estimates for the ju-
dicial quality interaction term are slightly reduced but still positive and highly
significant.
Aside from the qualitative results, another natural question is whether contract
enforcement also has an economically significant impact on R&D investments.
For example, if South Korea (25th percentile of the distribution) were to improve
its judicial quality to the level of Sweden (75th percentile of the distribution),
Korean’s R&D investment in the high contract-intensive industry “34: Motor ve-
hicles, trailers and semi-trailers industry” (75th percentile) would increase by 25%
more than it would in the low contract-intensive industry “27: Basic Metals” (25th
percentile).27
The effects of judicial quality on R&D investments are sizeable not only in
25While I use capital intensity to proxy for the demand of external finance at the industry level,
Maskus et al. (2011) follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Manova (2009) to use external finance
dependence and asset tangibility.
26In a similar estimation strategy and using similar data source, Manova (2009) obtained nearly
the same results for the interaction terms of physical capital endowment and capital intensity.
27Comparative statics are based on estimates reported in column (5) in Table 4.3.
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absolute values, but also in relative terms. While a one standard deviation increase
in the judicial quality interaction term increases R&D investments by 21% stan-
dard deviations, a similar increase in the human capital interaction term (physical
capital interaction term) increases the dependent variable by only 10% (–1%).28
29 Although, institutions tend to change very slowly, some countries such as Ice-
land (Slovak Republic) substantially improved their judicial quality by 0.94 (0.54)
during the period from 1995 to 2006, which approximately corresponds to an im-
provement of one (half) standard deviation. Hence, improving the judicial quality
of a country within a relatively short time period is feasible.
Next, I perform some additional regression analysis to build further confi-
dence into my estimated effect of contract institutions on R&D investments. The
results are reported in Table 4.4. First, I add an additional control variable, to
interact human capital endowment with contract intensity (column (6)). This
specification allows me to separate the effect of good contract institutions from
the effect that countries with high human capital endowment also tend to have
good contracting environments. My estimated coefficient for the interaction of
human capital and contract intensity is negative, which is counterintuitive, but is
also only borderline significant at the 10% level. However, my estimates for the
judicial quality interaction term are not affected by this. Second, I interact my
measure of financial development with contract intensity and obtain a positive
and significant effect (column (7)). Despite the high correlation between finan-
cial development and judicial quality (0.77), my estimated effect on the judicial
quality interaction term is still positive, although it now has been reduced to 0.164
and it is significant at the 10% level only. Finally, I include the log number of
establishments in a country by year and sector (column (8)). I find that my results
are nearly unchanged and that the total effect of judicial quality on R&D invest-
ments is independent of their effects on domestic output. In addition, if countries
had a comparative advantage in sectors not adequately modeled in my previous
specifications, I include the number of establishments to control for such effects.
28I report beta coefficients for my main results in Table C.2 in the Appendix B.
29My estimates for the interactions for human and physical capital may seem relatively low
compared with my interaction for judicial quality. However, they are of similar magnitude to that
what other studies have found (e.g. Nunn (2007), Levchenko (2008), or Manova (2009)).
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In column (9), I include a full set of country-year fixed effects to take into account
differences in economic development across countries over time, that may not be
captured by my two other country-time varying control variables GDP and GDP
per capita. None of my results is affected by this specification.
In a recent paper Miller et al. (2011) document that in the case of panel
datasets with different levels of grouping, controlling for correlation among error
terms only within one group may not be sufficient and estimated standard errors
can still be seriously biased downwards and thereby results can be misleading. In
my setup, the error term may not only be correlated across industries, but also
across countries. Column (10) reports the results using the methodology devel-
oped by Miller et al. (2011), which allows to implement a multi-way clustering
estimator. This estimator not only controls for potential correlations among the
error terms across industries and countries simultaneously, but also corrects for
potential correlation among the error terms at the country-industry level. In con-
trast to expectations, the standard errors for the judicial quality interaction term is
further reduced. This can be the case if there exists a negative correlation of the
error term across countries and industries.30
4.5.2 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
In the following sections, I test the robustness and sensitivity of my baseline spec-
ifications. In a first step, I report the results for the different specifications of the
judicial quality interaction term, different measures for contract intensity and al-
ternative measures for my dependent variable in Table 4.5. In Table 4.6 I present
the results for different measures for the judicial quality of a country. Finally, I
analyze the sensitivity of my estimates to potential outliers in Table 4.7.
For all estimates in Table 4.6 I show the results for the reduced form specifica-
tion where I only include the factor endowment interaction terms and the specifi-
cation with the full set of controls. In a first step, I lag all explanatory time-varying
variables once. This strategy helps to further mitigate potential simultaneity ef-
fects. My estimates for the judicial quality interaction term remain unchanged and
30In unreported results, I rerun all estimations using the multi-way clustering approach. All
results were nearly unchanged and thereby they had no significant influence on my results.
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support the hypothesis that in the proposed empirical specification simultaneity is
of less concern. Second, instead of using the 2002 U.S. I-O Table I reconstruct
my contract intensity measure zi using the 1997 U.S. I-O Table. If the assumption
holds that contract intensity is a sector-specific technological component that is
innate to a sector and does not change over time and especially is not affected by
R&D investments, then my results should not be affected by this. I find support
for this assumption in the data.
Next, I construct two alternative indices to measure the institutional depen-
dence of a sector and check if my estimates are sensitive to such changes. First,
I follow Nunn (2007) and reconstruct my measure for contract intensity zi. This
measure is constructed in exactly the same way as outlined in section 4.4. The
only difference between both measures is that I now allow for a broader definition
of relationship-specific products and also classify reference priced products, ac-
cording to the classification of Rauch (1999), as being relationship specific. While
my estimates do not change if the smaller set of controls is used, I obtain a posi-
tive but no longer significant result in the full specification. Here, it is important
to note that the ordering of industries slightly changes when the broader measure
zri is used, which can easily have a strong effect on my estimates.
31 Second, I fol-
low Levchenko (2007) and proxy product complexity using the Herfindahl index,
which measures the concentration of intermediate input use.32.33 Again, my es-
timates for the judicial quality interaction term are positive and highly significant
in both specifications.
In a final step, I check to what extent my results are robust, if I use different
measures for my dependent variable. Although the focus of this paper is to analyze
to what extent contract institutions affect a special form of investments, namely
R&D investments, the outlined theory in section 4.2 also applies to a broader
definition of investments. Therefore, I use gross investments at the industry level
31Further analysis revealed that if one of the following two sectors “19: Leather, leather products
and footwear” or “20: Wood and products of wood and cork” is excluded from the sample, the
results are similar to my previous estimates.
32Again, I multiply the Herfindahl index by -1 in order to have a measure that increases in
institutional intensity
33The Herfindahl index of intermediate input use, as a proxy for product complexity, has also
been used by Blanchard and Kremer (1997).
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as an alternative measure for my dependent variable.34 In line with my previous
results, I find a positive, significant and sizeable economic effect for my judicial
quality interaction term. Second, instead of using the absolute values of R&D
investments, I follow Maskus et al. (2011) and use R&D intensity at the industry
level. Using R&D investment intensity helps to mitigate any potential problems
arising from different industry sizes across countries. Again, I find a positive,
highly significant and sizeable economic effect of contract institutions on R&D
intensity.35
So far, I used “rule of law” as my primary measure for the judicial quality in
a country. I now consider different measures for Qct and re-estimate equation 4.1
using four alternative measures for the contracting environment. The results are
reported in Table 4.6. In the first two columns, I use different measures obtained
form the World Bank’s Doing Business Database. The database contains various
measures for the efficiency and costs of the judicial system in collecting an over-
due debt.36 In the first column, I report estimates if the number of days, and in
column two, if the number of procedures required, to collect an overdue debt is
used. In addition, I use two variables from La Porta et al. (1998) that measure
the risk of expropriation and the repudiation of contracts. Although the risk of ex-
propriation does not directly measure the quality of the contracting environment
between two parties, it highlights the problems associated with an inefficient judi-
cial system in a country. By contrast, the variable repudiation of contracts directly
measures the reliability of contracts in a country.
As can be seen from Table 4.8 all four measures are positively correlated with
my previous measure “rule of law”, but given the relatively low correlation, for
example, for the number of procedures these variables may capture different as-
pects of the judicial quality in a country.37 My estimates show that, whatever
kind of different measure I use for the judicial quality Qct I obtain positive, highly
significant and sizeable economic results for my interaction term of interest, em-
34I use gross investments, since data on net investments are only available for a small subsample
of countries and industries.
35See Table 4.9 for a comparison of the beta coefficients from different specifications.
36See Appendix C.1 for a detailed description of both variables.
37All variables are rescaled in a way such that positive values indicate a better judicial quality.
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phasizing the robustness of my results.38 In addition, all four variables are time-
invariant, which further helps with establish causality, since these variables do not
respond to changes in R&D investments over time, which is part of the identifica-
tion strategy.
Table 4.6: R&D Investments and Contracting Institutions - Robustness
Dependent variable: (log) R&D investments
Contract Institution Measure:
Time Number of Repudiation Risk of ex-
procedures of contracts propriation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Judicial Quality interaction: Qc ∗ zi 0.001 0.004 0.026 0.021
(2.38)** (4.86)*** (3.56)*** (2.91)***
H/L x H intensity: Hc ∗hi 1.838 1.709 1.995 2.130
(2.88)*** (2.79)*** (3.67)*** (3.98)***
K/L x K intensity: Kc ∗ ki –0.012 –0.011 –0.083 –0.008
(–1.57) (–1.33) (–0.62) (–0.75)
Additional Controls:
GDP, GDP per Capita, Country, Industry, Year FE,
Log inc. x Interactions, Fin. dev. x Interaction
Observations 4,278 4,271 3,810 3,810
R2 0.851 0.851 0.842 0.841
Notes: The dependent variable is log R&Dcst . The dependent variable is defined as the (log) R&D investments in country
c in a two-digit ISIC sector s, in year t for the 1997-2007. The measure of contract intensity zi is defined in the text. The
first row of the table indicates the different measure used to proxy the judicial quality Qc of a country and is described in
the text. All other control variables are as described in the Appendix C.1. Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
industry level. All regressions include a constant term. T-statistics in parenthesis. ***,** and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level.
In a final step, I verify that my results are not driven by outliers in the data. The
results are reported in Table 4.7. As a first robustness check, I consider whether
my results are driven by a particular selection of years in the sample. Therefore, I
spilt the sample into two periods, before 2000 and from 2000 onwards in columns
(1) and (2). In addition, in unreported results I also repeat each regression by
38For a comparison of the size of the effects using beta coefficients, see Table 4.9 in the Ap-
pendix B.
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excluding a random combination of two years from the sample. Aside from an in-
creased standard error because of the reduced number of observations, my results
indicate that my previous findings are not driven by a particular year.
Next, I test whether my results are driven by a particular country in the sample.
Therefore, I drop each single country and re-estimate equation 4.1. In columns
(3) and (4), I report those estimate which had the largest effect on my results. If
Poland is excluded from the sample my estimates for the judicial quality inter-
action term drops to 0.229 but is still significant at the 5% level. On the other
hand, if Norway is excluded, I obtain a coefficient of 0.359, which is also highly
significant.
Eventually, I confirm that my results are not driven by a certain industry. I
repeat the same exercise and exclude each industry in my estimates and rerun
my OLS regression for equation 4.1. Again, columns (5) and (6) report those
estimates that had the largest effect on my results. If the industry “34: Motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” is excluded from the sample my estimate drops
to 0.199 and is significant at the 5% level. By contrast, if I exclude the “30:
Office, accounting and computing machinery” industry, I obtain a coefficient of
0.497, which is also highly significant at the 1% level. Overall my findings in
Table 4.7 indicate that the results obtained in the previous analysis are not driven
by any particular outlier in the sample and that they appear to be very robust in all
specifications.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper I study the effect of contractual frictions on R&D investments for
29 OECD countries in 22 manufacturing industries for the period 1996 to 2006. I
develop an empirical framework based on the theoretical insights from the incom-
plete contracts literature. In these types of models, incomplete contracts in com-
bination with the necessity of relationship-specific investments lead to a hold-up
problem, resulting in under-investment in R&D. I test this prediction by exploit-
ing differences in the institutional environments across countries and differences
in the contractual dependence across industries. I find that firms in countries with
good contracting institutions have higher R&D investments, especially in indus-
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tries that are contractual dependent. According to my estimates, improving the
contracting environment in a country has sizeable economic effects on the levels
and compositions of R&D investments. I show that my results are robust to sev-
eral extensions and alternative measures of my main variables and that causality
can be established under fairly weak assumptions.
Although this paper presents a detailed analysis of the effects of contract-
ing institutions on R&D investments at the country-industry level, a number of
questions remain open for future research. Aside from the work by Lerner and
Malmendier (2010), we still know relatively little about the specific channels how
contracting institutions affect R&D investments at the more disaggregate microe-
conomic level and which types of contractual institutions work best to promote the
development of new products and ideas at the firm and industry level. In addition,
I mostly use aggregate indices such as the “rule of law” index from Kaufmann
et al. (2007) to measure the contracting environment in a country. Using more
detailed data about specific contracting institutions may also help to further im-
prove our understanding of the interaction of contracting institutions and R&D
investments.
Given the prominent role of R&D investments as a key driver of economic
growth, policymakers around the world over recent decades have strongly pro-
moted R&D investments, by providing tax incentives, direct and indirect subsidies
or infrastructural support. My results show that improving the contracting envi-
ronment is important for R&D spending, especially in sectors that produce more
complex goods and, therefore, are more dependent on good institutions. This
study underscores the importance of a good judicial system if R&D investments
are a major policy concern. Policymakers may wish to remove impediments re-
sulting from an inefficient and costly judicial system to attract and promote higher
R&D investments in order to improve the innovative capacity of an economy.
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C Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1 Data Description
Country Data
Physical capital Kc and Human capital Hc endowment : The stock of physical
capital per capita is the total capital stock divided by the total number of workers
in a country c. Human capital per worker is measured as the average years of
schooling in the population over 25 years old in country i. Source: Caselli (2005).
Financial development (Crct): Financial development is measured as the natural
log of private credit by banks and other financial institutions to the private sector
as a share of GDP in country c in period t. Source: Beck et al. (2000).
GDP, GDP (income) per capita: I use the variable “cgdp” for GDP per capita
(income per capita) from the Penn World Tables 7.0. I multiply it by the total
population of a country (“POP”) to calculate total GDP in a country c in year t.
Source: Penn World Tables 7.0.
Number of procedures, Time, Risk of expropriation, Repudiation of con-
tracts: The number of procedures is the total number of procedures mandated
by law or court regulation that demand interaction between the parties or between
them and the judge or court officer in a country. It ranges from 11 to 41, with a
higher value indicating more procedures. Time is the total estimated time of the
full legal procedure in calendar days. It equals the total time until the completion
of the service of process, duration of trial, or duration of enforcement. It ranges
from 48 to 1100, with a higher value indicating a longer time to complete the pro-
cess. The risk of expropriation index measures the risk of “outright confiscation”
or “forced nationalization”. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating
lower risk. The repudiation of contracts measures the “risk of a modification in
a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down” be-
cause of “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, or
a change in government economic and social priorities”. It ranges from 0 to 10,
with higher scores indicating lower risk. Summary statistics are depicted in Ta-
ble C.2 Sources: Bank (2004), Djankov et al. (2003), Kaufmann et al. (2007), La
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Porta et al..
Industry Data
Physical capital ki and human capital hi intensity: Physical capital intensity is
the ratio of total real capital stock (in millions of USD) and value added (in mil-
lions of USD) in industry i in the United States in 1996 to 2005. Human capital
intensity is measured as the share of nonproduction worker wages to total wages
in industry i for 1996 to 2005. Source: Bartelsman and Gray (1996) database.
TFP growth (t f pi): TFP growth is measured as the average growth rate in TFP
in the United States in industry i in 1996 to 2005. Source: UNIDO (2005).
Value added (vaict): Value added is measured as the share of value added to total
output in industry i in country c for 1996 to 2005. Source: OECD (2011) .
Herfindahl index (hi): The Herfindahl index is constructed using shares of inputs
used in industry i for the United States for 2002. Source: BEA - 2002 United
States I-O Use Table.
Intra-industry trade (iiti): I use trade data for the United States and the Grubel-
Lloyd index to measure intra-industry trade in industry i for the United States in
year t. Source: Feenstra et al. (2005) database.
Establishments (ncit): Is the number of domestically active firms in industry i in
country c in period t. Source: UNIDO (2005).
All other variables are as described in the text.
Concordance Tables
To combine data from different sources with different industry classification sys-
tems I construct two concordance tables.
BEA - HS (2002) - SITC Rev. 2 concordance BEA table: In order to match the
2002 United States I-O Use table into the Rauch (1999) product classification I
need to construct a concordance table from the SITC Rev. 2 to the BEA 2002 I-O
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classification system. First, I match the concordance table from the SITC Rev.
2 to the HS10 classification, provided by Jon Haveman‘s collection of industry
concordances. Second, I use the concordance table available from the BEA to
map the I-O system of industry classification to the HS10 classification. Finally,
I combine both tables and use the absolute number of HS10 links as an indicator
to match an I-O industry to an SITC Rev. 2 industry. In a few cases, one in-
dustry was equally linked into multiple industries. In this case, the mapping was
performed manually. This matching strategy results in one SITC Rev. 2 industry
being matched to only one I-O industry. Consequently, some I-O industries were
not matched to any SITC Rev. 2 industry.
BEA - NAICS (2002) - ISIC Rev. 3.1 concordance table: Since all industry
variables are measured at the two-digit ISIC rev. 3.1 level, I need to construct
a concordance table that maps the BEA 2002 I-O classification system into the
ISIC rev. 3.1 classification. In a first step I use the concordance table provided
by the BEA to aggregate the data from the 2002 Unites States I-O Use table to
the six-digit NAICS (2002) classification. Second, I use the correspondence ta-
ble provided by the United Nations Statistics division to map the NAICS (2002)
classification into the two-digit ISIC rev. 3.1 classification.
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C.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.8: Summary Statistics for Alternative Measures of Judicial Quality
Judical quality measure N Average Std Min Max
Time 25 259.72 220.08 48 1000
Number of procedures 25 21.72 6.34 11 41
Repudiation of contracts 23 8.92 0.98 5.95 9.98
Risk of expropriation 23 9.30 0.79 7.00 9.98
Correlations
Rule of law 1.000
Time 0.227 1.000
Number of procedures 0.285 0.506 1.000
Repudiation of contracts 0.778 0.267 0.267 1.000
Risk of expropriation 0.816 0.275 0.359 0.929 1.000
Notes: This table provide summary statistics for different measures used for the judical quality in a country, which vary
at the cross-section only. Data for rule of law are for the year 2000. As described in the data appendix in the empirical
analysis I re-scale all variables such that high value indicates a better judicial quality.
Table 4.9: R&D Investments and Contracting institutions - Economic Significance
Dependent variable:
R&D R&D Gross R&D
investments investments investments intensity
Judicial Quality interaction: Qct ∗ zi 21% 20% 61%
Herfindahl interaction: Qct ∗ (1−hi) 36%
H/L x H intensity: Hc ∗hi 10% 2% 4% 15%
K/L x K intensity: Kc ∗ ki -1% 0% 0% 4%
Contract Institution Measure:
Time Number of Repudiation Risk of ex-
procedures of contracts propriation
Judicial Quality interaction: Qc ∗ zi 8% 14% 19% 16%
Notes: This table evaluates the economic significance of the effect of contracting institutions on R&D investments. All
values are in percentage points and show the effect of a one standard deviation increase of the explanatory variable on
R&D investments. The upper part of the table depicts results for the baseline specification, for the Herfindahl index as
alternative measure for contract intensity and for my two alternative proxies of R&D investments. The lower part of the
table reports results for my four different measures of the contracting environment. All results are based on my estimates
reported in tables 4.3 to 4.7.
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